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JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to §
78-3-4 of the Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I. Did the Utah trial court err in transferring jurisdiction to the Georgia trial court
under the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) and
the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 (PKPA)? This issue is preserved
in the Mr. Kingdon's Motion to Continue Jurisdiction and Objection to Relinquishment
of Jurisdiction.
II. Did the trial court fail to follow statutory requirements when it did not allow
the Mr. Kingdon opportunity to be heard before making its determination regarding
jurisdiction? Mr. Kingdon had no opportunity to raise this issue in the trial court before
the court had already made its decision regarding jurisdiction.
III. Did the trial court fail to make any findings to support its conclusion that
Georgia is the proper forum to hear this case? Mr. Kingdon had no opportunity to raise
this issue in the trial court before the final order was entered.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATE STATUTES
The Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, Utah Code
Ann. § 78-45c-101 etseq.
The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C.A., § 1738A.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal concerning proper jurisdiction of a child custody matter. Over the
objection of the Mr. Kingdon, the Honorable Judge Roger A. Livingston of the Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, vacated a child custody modification
entered by the Third District Court and transferred jurisdiction of the case to the Superior
Court of Mcintosh County, Georgia.
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The parties to the proceedings were divorced in the state of Kansas in 1989, and
custody of their two minor children, Julie Marie Kingdon and Stacie Marie Kingdon, was
awarded to Mrs. Kingdon. (R. 13, 17) Both Mr. and Mrs. Kingdon left the state of
Kansas in 1989, and neither has resided in Kansas since then. (R. 178)
Although Mrs. Kingdon was awarded custody of the minor children, both girls lived
with Mr. Kingdon by mutual consent of the parties for substantial periods of time in the
years following the divorce. (R. 54; see also Georgia Custody Hearing included in the
Addendum [hereinafter cited as "Ga. Hearing"] p. 20, 41-44)
In June of 2001, Mr. Kingdon filed a Motion to Enforce Visitation with the Kansas
court that had entered the initial child custody order, alleging that Mrs. Kingdon had
interfered with his summer visitation with the girls. (R. 282-283) On June 27, 2001,
Judge Meryl Wilson of the Kansas court dismissed the motion based on the finding that
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, had assumed jurisdiction of

2

the matter. (R. 282-283) On June 29, 2001, Mr. Kingdon filed a second Motion to
Enforce Visitation, this time with the Third Judicial District Court. (R. 150-154) The
matter went into mediation, and no subsequent hearing was held by the Court regarding
the visitation matter. (R. 176)
On June 5, 2002, Mr. Kingdon filed a Verified Petition for Modification of Child
Custody in the Third District Court. (R. 177-181) The Petition was for split custody of
the children, based upon a material and substantial change of living circumstances. (R.
179) The modification was stipulated to by the parties. (R. 184-185, 196).
On June 11, 2002, the Third District Court entered its Order Modifying Child
Custody, awarding custody of Julie to Mrs. Kingdon, and custody of Stacie to Mr.
Kingdon. (R. 201-203) At the time the order was entered, Julie was living with her
mother in Georgia, and Stacie had lived with her father in Utah for nearly 11 months
(since July 17,2001). (R. 197)
On June 4, 2002, Stacie flew from Utah to Georgia to visit her mother, ostensibly for
a one-month visit, with a return flight scheduled for July 1, 2002. (R. 208-209, 212)
Shortly before Stacie's scheduled return, however, Mrs. Kingdon informed Mr. Kingdon
that she refused to return Stacie as planned, notwithstanding a change of custody had
already occurred.

(R. 207) When Mrs. Kingdon failed to send Stacie back on the

scheduled date, Mr. Kingdon filed a Motion for Writ of Assistance on July 3, 2002,
requesting the Court's assistance in having Stacie returned to Utah. (R. 215-216). That
same day (July 3rd), Mr. Kingdon appeared personally before Judge Livingston of the
Third Judicial District Court. (R. 214) Judge Livingston denied Mr. Kingdon5 s Motion
3

for a Writ of Assistance, and noted that he would consider setting a hearing when all
parties could be present for the issues to be heard. (R. 214)
On July 3, 2002, Mrs. Kingdon filed a Petition for Change of Custody and a Motion
for Ex Parte Relief in the Superior Court of Mcintosh County, Georgia, alleging that
Stacie had been subject to abuse while in Utah. (R. 221-225, 239-243)
After Mr. Kingdon was served with a copy of Mrs. Kingdon's Petition for Change of
Custody through the Georgia court, he filed a motion on July 19, 2002, in the Third
District Court asking the Court to continue its jurisdiction and objecting to any
relinquishment of said jurisdiction. (R. 250-255) On an unknown date, prior to receiving
Mr. Kingdon's objection to relinquishment of jurisdiction, Judge Livingston conferred
with Judge Robert L. Russell of the Macintosh County Superior Court, and the judges
agreed that Georgia should assume jurisdiction of the case (R. 268, 287)
Mr. Kingdon later requested the Third Judicial District Court to produce a record of
the aforementioned telephone conversation between Judge Livingston and Judge Russell.
(R. 284-285) On Oct. 4, 2002, the Court indicated that its record of communication with
the Georgia Court consisted of the Minute Entry (and final order regarding jurisdiction)
dated July 30, 2002. (R. 291)
C. DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW
On July 30, 2002, the Honorable Judge Roger A. Livingston of the Third Judicial
District Court made a signed Minute Entry in which he ordered the following:
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(a) That the prior child custody modification order entered by the Court on June 11,
2002, awarding custody of the minor child, Stacie Kingdon, to her father be vacated. (R.
268)
(b) That jurisdiction of the case be transferred to the State of Georgia. (R.268)
D. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The original child custody order for this case was entered in the State of Kansas,
where custody of both children was awarded to Mrs. Kingdon (R. 17) Shortly thereafter,
all parties to that order left Kansas and lost significant connection to that state. (R. 178)
With the exception of changes to child support obligation, no other state modified the
Kansas order until Utah entered the split custody order of June 11, 2002, awarding
custody of Julie Kingdon to her mother, and Stacie Kingdon to her father. (R. 196-199,
201-202)
In June 2001, the Kansas court, in fact, refused to hear a dispute between the parties
concerning visitation, based on its finding that the Third Judicial District Court of Salt
Lake County, Utah, had assumed jurisdiction. (R. 282-283) Although Mrs. Kingdon and
both girls lived in Georgia at the time, Mrs. Kingdon chose to use the Utah court system
to mediate the matter. (R. 176). She also signed a consent to the personal jurisdiction of
the Utah court when she agreed to the split custody arrangement. (R. 184-185)
Since the original order was entered in Kansas and the parties left the state at the end
of 1989, Mr. Kingdon is a long-term resident of the State of Utah. (R. 197). His
residency status has not changed during the course of the custody dispute. (R. 288) Mrs.
Kingdon has resided in various states, most recently in the State of Georgia, from about
5

March 1999 to the present. (R. 197; Ga. Hearing p. 13) Even though Mrs. Kingdon had
legal custody of the girls, she permitted them to live with their father for extended periods
of time. (R. 54; Ga. Hearing p. 20, 41-44). At the time of the Third District Court's
custody modification order, Julie was living with her mother in Georgia, and Stacie had
resided with her father in Utah the preceding 11 months. (R.197) More specifically,
Stacie resided with Mr. Kingdon from July 17, 2002, until June 4, 2002, at which time
she went back to Georgia for a visit planned to last only until July 1, 2002. (R. 208-209,
212)
On July 1, 2002, Mrs. Kingdon refused to put Stacie on her scheduled return flight to
Utah. (R. 206-207) On July 3, 2002, less than a month after the change of custody had
been filed in Utah, Mrs. Kingdon petitioned the Superior Court of Mcintosh County,
Georgia, for temporary and permanent custody of Stacie, based on the claim of an
emergency situation due to alleged abuse of the child while the child had been in Utah.
(R. 221-225, 239-243) The pleadings to the Georgia court also made note that Stacie was
14 years of age, the age at which a child can elect which parent has custody under
Georgia statute. (R. 223, 241) At no time did Mrs. Kingdon attempt to bring the matter
back to the Utah court.
On July 3, 2002, Mr. Kingdon filed a Motion for Writ of Assistance with the Third
District Court in an attempt to gain the Court's assistance in enforcement of its custody
order. (R. 215-216). Mr. Kingdon appeared before the Honorable Judge Livingston in
the District courtroom. (R. 214) Judge Livingston decided not to sign the Writ, but said
he would consider holding a hearing to investigate the matter more fully. (R. 214)
6

On July 8, 2002, Judge Livingston received notice that a custody proceeding had been
initiated in the Georgia court. (R. 220) Judge Livingston then contacted Judge Robert L.
Russell of the Mcintosh County Superior Court, and the judges decided that Georgia
should assume jurisdiction of the case. (R. 268, 287) The judges agreed Georgia should
have jurisdiction, even though neither judge questioned the validity of Judge Livingston's
modification order of June 11th. (Ga. Hearing p. 29-30) Mr. Kingdon was not allowed to
participate in the communication between the courts, nor was any record kept clearly
setting forth the basis of the agreement between the judges. (R. 284-285, 291; Ga.
Hearing p. 46) When Mr. Kingdon later requested that the Third District Court provide
him with a copy of the record of communication between the courts, Judge Livingston
indicated that his Minute Entry of July 30, 2002, was the record in question. (R. 291)
After Mr. Kingdon had also received notice of the custody proceedings initiated in
Georgia, he filed a Motion to Continue Jurisdiction and Objection to Relinquish
Jurisdiction on July 19, 2002, in the Third District Court. (R. 250-255). In said motion,
Mr. Kingdon argued that Utah had proper jurisdiction of the case under UCCJEA and the
PKPA. (R. 250-255) When Mr. Kingdon contacted Judge Livingston's office on July
23, 2002, to see if the judge had reviewed the motion, one of the judge's assistants
informed Mr. Kingdon that Judge Livingston had contacted Judge Russell some days
prior and that the judges had already decided that Georgia should assume jurisdiction;
said communication between Judge Livingston and Judge Russell would have occurred a
few days after July 8, 2002 (R. 220)

Judge Livingston's final order transferring

jurisdiction to Georgia makes no mention of the PKPA. (R. 268) Nor does said order set
7

forth any findings of fact supporting its conclusion that jurisdiction of the case is properly
vested with the State of Georgia. (R. 268)
On August 2, 2002, the Honorable Judge Robert L. Russell of the Superior Court of
Mcintosh County, Georgia, ordered that the State of Georgia assume jurisdiction of the
case. (R. 281) On August 19, 2002, a hearing was held in the Superior Court to
determine custody of the minor children, (see Ga. Hearing in the Addendum) Mr.
Kingdon appeared at the hearing, and entered his objection to the proceedings on the
grounds that Utah, not Georgia, had proper jurisdiction of the matter. (Ga. Hearing p. 29, 40-41) Judge Russell answered some questions posed by Mr. Kingdon regarding how
the judges had decided that Georgia should assume jurisdiction. (Ga. Hearing p. 27-30)
However, Judge Russell admitted that no record had been kept of the communication
between himself and Judge Livingston. (Ga. Hearing p. 46) Mr. Kingdon was also given
opportunity to question Mrs. Kingdon regarding facts pertinent to the matter of
jurisdiction, including where the children had resided and for how long, whether she had
consented to the custody modification made in Utah, and why she had petitioned the
Georgia court for modification of the custody order rather than returning to the Utah.
(Ga. Hearing p. 18-26, 30-31) The hearing resulted in an award of custody of both
children to Mrs. Kingdon, based on the fact that Judge Livingston had declined to
exercise jurisdiction, that the Georgia court had assumed jurisdiction, and that the child
election laws of the State of Georgia allowed the children to choose to live with their
mother. (Ga. Hearing p. 44-45) Judge Russell made no finding regarding the alleged
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abuse of Stacie while she lived with her father, the key issue that had fomented the
change of jurisdiction from Utah to Georgia in the first place. (Ga. Hearing p. 41-45)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Utah has proper jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody
and Jurisdiction Act and the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act.

The child

custody modification order entered by the Third Judicial District Court on June 11, 2002
was made in accordance with the aforementioned Acts. Once the Third District Court
had entered its custody order, it had continuing jurisdiction over the case, and no other
state had authority to modify its determination while jurisdiction was vested with Utah,
unless Utah lost jurisdiction or declined to exercise its jurisdiction. The Third District
Court did not lose jurisdiction, and should not have declined to exercise jurisdiction,
based on the rules of UCCJEA and PKPA and clear legal precedence.
In the course of the proceedings, the Third District Court did not give the Mr.
Kingdon the opportunity to be heard before rendering its decision regarding jurisdiction.
Once the Utah court had been notified of the Georgia petition to modify the Utah order
based on an alleged emergency situation, the Utah court should have held a hearing to
allow both parties to present evidence before any decision was made regarding
jurisdiction. No such hearing was held. Although the judges of the Utah and Georgia
trial courts did contact each other, no record was made of the communication between the
courts as required.
In reaching its conclusion that jurisdiction of this case was properly vested with
the State of Georgia, the Third District Court made no findings of fact to support said
9

conclusion. Without appropriate findings, the trial court's decision regarding jurisdiction
is unjustified, and should be reversed by the appellate court.
ARGUMENT
I. UTAH HAS PROPER JURISDICTION UNDER UCCJEA AND PKPA
A. The Utah trial court had jurisdiction to enter the custody modification
order of June 11, 2002,
The State of Kansas entered the initial child custody order for this case in
September 1989. Shortly thereafter, however, both Mr. Kingdon and Mrs. Kingdon, and
the minor children, left the State of Kansas and have not resided there again. The Kansas
court which had entered the original custody order even refused to entertain a dispute
over the father's visitation rights in the summer of 2001, based on the finding that the
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, was the proper venue to hear the
visitation matter. Since Mr. Kingdon, Mrs. Kingdon, and the children had long since left
the State of Kansas and no longer had any significant connection to that State, by the time
the Third District Court in Utah entered its child custody modification order, Kansas no
longer had jurisdiction over child custody.
Did, then, the State of Utah have a proper jurisdiction to enter its child custody
modification order of June 11, 2002? A review of the relevant statutes shows that Utah
did indeed have authority to enter the order.
The Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act and the
federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act are designed to determine which state has
jurisdiction over custody actions. Under UCCJEA, specifically Utah Code Ann. § 7810

45c-203, the State of Utah had jurisdiction to modify the Kansas order based on the fact
that 1) Utah had jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody determination under U.C.A.
§ 78-45c-201, and 2) the children and parents no longer resided in the State of Kansas.
The fact that the children and parents no longer resided in Kansas is evident from the
record. Utah met the provisions of U.C.A. § 78-45c-201 for making an initial childcustody determination by virtue of the fact that Stacie Kingdon's home state was Utah at
the time of the modification order, and Julie Kingdon had a significant connection with
the state of Utah and there was substantial evidence available in Utah concerning her
care, protection, training, and personal relationships.
The modification order of June 11, 2002, likewise met the provisions of the
PKPA, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A. This statute provides:
(f) A court of a State may modify a determination of the custody of the same
child made by a court of another State, if—
(1) it has jurisdiction to make such a child custody determination; and
(2) the court of the other State no longer has jurisdiction, or it has declined
to exercise such jurisdiction to modify such determination.
Utah had jurisdiction under its own state laws to make the child custody
determination, and Kansas no longer had jurisdiction of the matter, thus satisfying the
requirements of the PKPA.
The child custody modification order entered by the Third District Court was done
with Mrs. Kingdon's consent. It is possible that the split custody arrangement, which the
parties agreed was in the best interests of the children, could have been effected through
the Georgia courts, since Julie Kingdon's home state was Georgia at the time of the
modification.

The State of Georgia's laws regarding jurisdiction of a child custody
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matter are very similar to Utah's. However, Mrs. Kingdon was satisfied to use the Utah
court for the agreed-upon modification, and she never petitioned the Georgia court to
exercise jurisdiction until after the Third District Court had already entered its
modification order. Once she had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Utah court, she was
bound by the determination of that court, in accordance with U.C.A. § 78-45c-106.
It is also important to note that both Judge Livingston of Utah and Judge Russell
of Georgia never questioned the validity of Utah's modification order when they
conferred about which state should have jurisdiction.

During the Georgia custody

hearing on August 19, 2002, Mr. Kingdon asked Judge Russell if either judge had
questioned the propriety of the existing Utah order. Judge Russell said that "that wasn't
challenged." When Mr. Kingdon asked if the judges had believed Utah exercised proper
jurisdiction to make the modification, Judge Russell replied: "Judge Livingston thought
so at the time."
B. The Utah trial court had exclusive, continuing jurisdiction after the custody
modification.
Under UCCJEA, once the Utah court entered its child custody modification order, the
court had exclusive, continuing jurisdiction of the case. U.C.A. § 78-45c-202 provides
that having made a child-custody determination consistent with § 203, Utah retains
jurisdiction until all the children and parents lose "significant connection" to the state or
no longer reside in the state. Mr. Kingdon has remained a resident of the State of Utah
from the time the child custody modification order was entered to the present; thus Utah
retained continuing jurisdiction under UCCJEA.
12

Under PKPA, jurisdiction continues with the same court as long as the court has
jurisdiction under the laws of that state and that state remains the residence of the child or
of any contestant (28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(d)). Utah had continuing jurisdiction under
U.C.A. § 78-45c-202, and Mr. Kingdon remained a Utah resident; thus Utah retained
continuing jurisdiction under PKPA.
C The Utah trial court erred in declining to exercise jurisdiction.
While Utah had exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under UCCJEA and PKPA, no
other state had a right to modify the Utah custody order, unless Utah lost jurisdiction or
declined to exercise jurisdiction (28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(f)).

Utah did not lose its

jurisdiction (as shown in B above), but did err in declining to exercise jurisdiction.
U.C.A. § 78-45c-207 and 208 provide reasons why a Utah court may decline to
exercise jurisdiction over a child-custody determination.

Section 208 deals with

declining jurisdiction by reason of unjustifiable conduct on the part of the person
invoking the court's jurisdiction, and does not apply in this instance.

Section 207

provides that a Utah court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if it determines that it is
an inconvenient forum and another state is a more convenient forum.

According to

subsection (1): "The issue of inconvenient forum may be raised upon the court's own
motion, request of another court, or motion of a party." Neither Mr. Kingdon nor Mrs.
Kingdon ever raised the issue of inconvenient forum in the Third Judicial District Court,
and there is no clear indication on the record that the trial courts of Utah or Georgia
raised the issue, either. Judge Livingston's final order regarding jurisdiction does not say
that Utah was determined to be an inconvenient forum; it says rather "that the forum for
13

determining custody of both minor children, Stacie and Julie, is properly vested with the
State of Georgia." Without knowing what the Utah trial court's basis was for concluding
that Georgia was the proper forum for a custody determination, it is a matter of
speculation to say whether or not the Court applied the rules of § 207 to this case.
It would appear, however, from Judge Russell's findings at the conclusion of the
August 19, 2002, hearing in the Georgia trial court, that U.C.A. § 78-45c-207 might not
have been the basis used by the Utah court in declining to exercise jurisdiction. Judge
Russell stated:
"Judge Livingston declined to exercise Utah jurisdiction and agreed that Georgia was
the home state of both children because of significant contacts and the best interest of the
children and emergency action needed."
It would seem, rather, that Judge Livingston erred in his interpretation of the "home
state" definition, which under UCCJEA and PKPA is the state where the child resided for
the six months preceding a custody determination (U.C.A. § 78-45c-102(7) and 28
U.S.C.A. § 1738A(b)(4)). Under the definitions of both Acts, when Utah entered its
custody modification order on June 11th, Julie's home state was Georgia, and Stacie's
home state was Utah.
Even if the provisions of U.C.A. § 78-45c-207 had been applied to this case, however,
it should be evident that Utah would have been the most appropriate forum to entertain
any proceeding to modify its own custody order of June 11, 2002. The primary factors to
consider would have been Mrs. Kingdon's allegations of child abuse and the nature and
location of the evidence regarding the alleged abuse. If the alleged abuse had really taken
place, evidence thereof would have been found in the State of Utah in the form of school
14

and/or medical records, the testimony of witnesses in Utah who had close contact with
Stacie and her family, etc. (The Third Judicial District Court and the Mcintosh County
Superior Court never made any findings of abuse, nor did either court ever even attempt
to ascertain whether Mrs. Kingdon's allegations of abuse were true.) The other relevant
factors listed in U.C.A. § 78-45-C-207 for the Utah court to consider would not have had
as much import as the charges of abuse and the alleged emergency situation rising
therefrom.
Without clearly establishing that Utah was an inconvenient forum to make a childcustody determination, Judge Livingston's order vacating the previous child custody
modification order and transferring jurisdiction to the State of Georgia violates both the
UCCJEA and PKPA. These Acts are specifically designed to determine which state has
jurisdiction over custody actions.

They attempt to set jurisdiction where the most

evidence is located and are designed to prevent parents from taking their children from
one jurisdiction to another in an attempt to gain advantage over the other parent with
regards to custody issues.
Mr. Kingdon contends in his Motion to Continue Jurisdiction and Objection to
Relinquishment of Jurisdiction that in filing a Petition for Change of Custody in the
Superior Court of Mcintosh County, Georgia, Mrs. Kingdon was seeking an advantage
she could obtain in the Georgia court that she could not obtain in the Utah court; namely,
the child-election laws of the State of Georgia, which allow a child of age fourteen or
older to choose which parent with whom she desires to live. Georgia Code § 19-9-1
includes the following provision:
15

In all cases in which the child has reached the age of 14 years, the child shall have the
right to select the parent with whom he or she desires to live. The child's selection shall
be controlling, unless the parent so selected is determined not to be a fit and proper
person to have the custody of the child.
Although Mrs. Kingdon denied prior knowledge of Georgia's child election laws
during the August 19th hearing in the Mcintosh County Superior Court, both her Petition
for Change of Custody and Motion for Ex Parte Relief filed previously in the Georgia
court made specific mention of Stacie's age as grounds for obtaining the relief Mrs.
Kingdon sought. As it turned out, Mrs. Kingdon did gain the advantage that she sought—
Georgia's child election provision was the sole determining factor for awarding custody
of Julie and Stacie to Mrs. Kingdon in the Georgia trial court.
Even if Mrs. Kingdon didn't intend to use Georgia's child election laws to her
advantage, the fact remains that she, the non-custodial parent, knowingly detained Stacie
from Mr. Kingdon, the custodial parent, and never sought to resolve the matter through
the Utah court which had entered the custody order, with Mrs. Kingdon's consent, less
than one month prior to her filing a complaint in the Georgia court.
In the case of Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), after a custody
order was entered in the State of Utah, the non-custodial father, William Curtis, took the
children to Mississippi and filed for a change of custody in the Mississippi court. He
claimed that the need to modify custody resulted from an "emergency situation"
involving abuse of the children.

The Utah trial court transferred jurisdiction to the

Mississippi trial court, but that judgment was reversed by the Utah Court of Appeals. In
its published opinion, the Court of Appeals found that: 1) Utah had jurisdiction for the
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initial custody decree, 2) that Utah had continuing jurisdiction to modify the decree and
had not lost jurisdiction, and 3) that Utah had not declined to exercise its jurisdiction. In
regards to the issue of declining jurisdiction the Court noted:
A second state with jurisdiction may modify a first state's custody decree if the first
state has declined to exercise jurisdiction. See, e.g., E.E.B. v. D.A., 89 N.J. 595, 446 A.2d
871, 877 (1982). However William never requested Utah courts to exercise their
modification jurisdiction. Rather, he chose to try his luck in another forum. Therefore,
not having had the opportunity to exercise its jurisdiction, we hold that the Utah court had
not declined to exercise it as of the time the Mississippi orders were entered.
Mrs. Kingdon likewise never requested the Third Judicial District Court to exercise
its modification jurisdiction, but chose to try her luck in another forum. The Court of
Appeals should find that since Mrs. Kingdon never returned to the Third District Court,
said Court should not have declined to exercise jurisdiction.
II. THE

UTAH

OPPORTUNITY

TRIAL COURT
TO

BE

HEARD

FAILED TO
BEFORE

GIVE

MR.

KINGDON

MAKING

ITS

DECISION

REGARDING JURISDICTION
A. The Utah trial court did not allow Mr. Kingdon to present facts and legal
arguments before it agreed with the Georgia trial court that Georgia should assume
jurisdiction.
The UCCJEA, in U.C.A. § 78-45c-l 10, provides that a Court of the State of Utah
may communicate with a court of another state as a means of reaching an appropriate
jurisdictional determination. Subsection (2) states:
The court may allow the parties to participate in the communication. If the parties
are not able to participate in the communication, the parties shall be given the opportunity
to present facts and legal arguments before a decision on jurisdiction is made.
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When Judge Livingston of the Third Judicial District Court conferred with Judge
Russell of the Mcintosh County Superior Court as to which State had proper jurisdiction
of this child custody matter, the judges did not ask Mr. Kingdon, nor apparently Mrs.
Kingdon or her attorney, to participate in the communication.

Although the Third

District Court was not required to have the parties participate, no effort was made to see
if an arrangement could be made for all parties to participate.
The second sentence of § 110(2) does require the Court to give any party which is
not able to participate in the communication the opportunity to present facts and make
legal argument prior to the determination of jurisdiction.

The commentary in the

Uniform Child Custody Jur. & Enf. Act (U.L.A.) § 110 provides further elucidation
regarding this requirement:
The second sentence of subsection [2] protects the parties against unauthorized ex
parte communications. The parties' participation in the communication may amount to a
hearing if there is an opportunity to present facts and jurisdictional arguments. However,
absent such an opportunity, the participation of the parties should not be considered a
substitute for a hearing and the parties must be given an opportunity to fairly and fully
present facts and arguments on the jurisdictional issue before a determination is made.
This may be done through a hearing or, if appropriate, by affidavit or memorandum. The
court is expected to set forth the basis for its jurisdictional decision, including any courtto-court communication which may have been a factor in the decision.
(The comment above is found in Uniform Laws Annotated, Master Edition, Vol.
9, Part IA, p. 667, c. 1999, published by West Group.)
The Third District Court should have held a hearing regarding the jurisdictional
issue, or at least allowed the parties to submit written statements before the decision
regarding jurisdiction was made. In Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157 (Utah App. 1992)
the Court of Appeals found that the District Court of Iron County, Utah, erred in refusing
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to hold a hearing regarding a jurisdictional determination and violated Mrs. Holm's due
process rights by refusing her attorney's request for a hearing on an undomesticated Ohio
order. Likewise, without allowing Mr. Kingdon the opportunity to present evidence and
make argument before it reached its jurisdictional decision, the Third Judicial District
Court not only erred, but in effect abrogated Mr. Kingdon's due process rights.
Mr. Kingdon did file a Motion to Continue Jurisdiction and Objection to
Relinquishment of Jurisdiction, on July 19, 2002, but this was done apparently after
Judge Livingston and Judge Russell had already conferred and reached their
jurisdictional decision. The aforesaid Motion was not made in response to a request by
the Court for facts and legal argument regarding jurisdiction, but was made only after Mr.
Kingdon had been served with notice of the child custody proceedings initiated in
Georgia.

Mr. Kingdon did not receive notification from the District Court that a

communication between the Utah and Georgia trial courts had occurred until July 30,
2002, in the final order regarding jurisdiction.

Neither the Utah trial court nor the

Georgia trial court made any mention of the PKPA in rendering their jurisdictional
decisions—a statute cited repeatedly by Mr. Kingdon in the aforesaid Motion, because
neither court had received or reviewed the motion before jurisdictional determination was
made.
B, No record was kept of the communication between the Utah and Georgia
trial courtsThe UCCJEA, in U.C.A. § 78-45c-l 10, provides that a record shall be kept of the
communication between the courts:
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(4) Except as provided in Subsection (3), a record shall be made of the
communication. The parties shall be informed promptly of the communication and
granted access to the record.
(5) For the purposes of this section, "record" means information that is inscribed
on a tangible medium or that which is stored in an electronic or other medium and is
retrievable in perceivable form. A record includes notes or transcripts of a court reporter
who listened to a conference call between the courts, an electronic recording of a
telephone call, a memorandum or an electronic record of the communication between the
courts, or a memorandum or an electronic record made by a court after the
communication.
The Third District Judicial Court failed to keep a record of its communication with the
Mcintosh County Superior Court, as "record" is defined in the statute cited above. Such
"record" cannot be the brief entry in Judge Livingston's Minute Entry of July 30, 2002,
noting that the courts had communicated, lacking any details of said communication.
Even so, Judge Livingston claims that his reference to telephoning Judge Russell in the
aforesaid Minute Entry is the "record" in his October 4, 2002 response to Mr. Kingdon's
Motion to Obtain Record.
However, such a record must clearly set forth the basis for any agreement between the
communicating courts. In Footnote 9 of State in Interest of D.S.K., 792 P.2d 118 (Utah
App. 1990), the Utah Court of Appeals recommended:
That where judges communicate by telephone, they make prompt written record of
their conclusions and that the basis for any agreement be set forth clearly in the record.
Judge Russell of the Georgia trial court verified that no record was kept of the
communication between himself and Judge Livingston.

The exact date of their

communication cannot even be found in the record on appeal, only approximated from
the July 8, 2002, fax cover sheet from Mrs. Kingdon's attorney to the District Court, in
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which the attorney noted that Judge Russell would call Judge Livingston "within a day or
so." Without keeping the record of communication required under UCCJEA, the Utah
trial court cannot establish that it did give Mr. Kingdon opportunity to be heard before the
Court made its jurisdictional determination.
III. THE UTAH TRIAL COURT FAILED TO SUPPORT ITS CONCLUSION
REGARDING JURISDICTION WITH ANY FINDINGS OF FACT
A. The Utah trial court made no findings of fact to warrant a transfer of
jurisdiction to Georgia.
Judge Livingston's final order vacating his previous child custody modification
order and transferring jurisdiction to Georgia is based on the conclusion "that the forum
for determining custody of both minor children, Stacie and Julie, is properly vested with
the State of Georgia." However, nowhere in the final order, or anywhere else in the
record on appeal, does Judge Livingston support this conclusion with any findings of
fact.

Without a valid basis for transferring jurisdiction of this case to the State of

Georgia, Judge Livingston has committed an abuse of his judicial discretion.
CONCLUSION STATING THE RELIEF SOUGHT
The Appellant, Mr. Kingdon, seeks a reversal of the Third Judicial District Court's
order vacating its prior child custody modification order of June 11, 2002, and a
reinstatement of that prior custody order. More specifically:
1) A ruling that the State of Utah has proper jurisdiction of this child custody matter
under the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act and the
federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act.
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2) A ruling that the trial court failed to give Mr. Kingdon opportunity to be heard
before it made its determination to transfer jurisdiction to Georgia.
3) A ruling that the trial court failed to make findings of fact to support its conclusion
that Georgia was the proper forum for this matter.
4) To remand the case to the trial court for any further proceedings concerning
custody of the minor children, and to admonish the trial court to follow the
procedures outlined in UCCJEA and PKPA in any future child custody
proceedings.
DATED this 17th day of December, 2002.

^eju

Brian Lee Kingdon, Pro Se

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I personally hand carried and delivered eight true and accurate
copies of the above Appellant's Brief to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 and mailed, first-class postage prepaid, two true
and accurate copies to C. Jean Bolin, Attorney for Mrs. Kingdon, P.O. Box 2332, Darien,
GA 31305, this 17th day of December, 2002.

Brian Lee Kingdon, Pro S;

ADDENDUM
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45c-101, et seq. (Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
and Enforcement Act, or UCCJEA)
28 U.S.CA. § 1738A (Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, or PKPA)
Certified Transcript of Child Custody Hearing Held August 19, 2002 in the Superior
Court of Mcintosh County, Georgia
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CHAPTER 45b
PUBLIC SUPPORT OF CHILDREN
[REPEALED]
78-45b-l to 78-45b-25.

Repealed.

Repeals. — Laws 1988, ch 1, § 407 repeals
§§ 78-45b 1 to 78 45b 6, as enacted by Laws
1975, ch 96, § 1 Laws 1977 ch 145 § 1, and
Laws 1985, ch 8, § 2 and as amended by Laws
1987 ch 77, § 3 and Laws 1987, ch 161,
§§ 309 to 312 relating to common law reme
dies, definitions, support debt and hearings,
effective J a n u a r y 19 1988
Laws 1987, ch 161, § 314 repeals § 78-45b
6 1, as last amended by Laws 1983, ch 161,
§ 2 concerning findings in order by depart
ment and judicial review, effective J a n u a r y 1,
1988
Laws 1988 ch 1, § 407 repeals §§ 78 45b 7
to 78-45b 2 1 , as enacted by Laws 1975, ch 96,
§§ 7, 10, 12 14 to 18, 20 and 2 1 , Laws 1984
(S S ), ch 2, § 1 and Laws 1985, ch 9, § 1 and
as amended by Laws 1977, ch 145, § 8, Laws
1984, ch 14, ^ 1, Laws 1984 (S S ), ch 2, § 2,

Laws 1985, ch 10, § 1 and Laws 1987, ch 151
§ 313, relating to hens, final orders, paymenta
and charging all uncollectable support debts,
effective J a n u a r y 19, 1988
Section 78 45b-22 (L 1975, ch 96, § 22),
relating to inapplicability of statute of limitations to hens wage assignment or garnishment, was repealed by Laws 1985, ch 10, § 2.
Laws 1988, ch 1, § 407 repeals W 78-45b-23
to 78 45b 25 as enacted by Laws 1984, ch. 13,
§ 5 Laws 1985, ch 13, § 1 and Laws 1987, ch!
77 § 4 relating to medical and dental expenses of dependent children, providing court
debt information to consumer reporting agencies and the information received from state
tax commissioner, effective January 19, 1988,
For present comparable provisions, see Title
62A Chapter 11

CHAPTER 45c
UTAH UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY
JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT
ACT
Section

Section
78 45c-112

78 45c 1 to 78 45c 26 Repealed
Part 1

78 45c 101
78-45c 102
78-45c 103
78-45c 104
78-45c 105
78 45c 106
78 45c 107
78 45c 108
78 45c 109
78 45c 110
78 45c 111

Cooperation between courts
Preservation of records
Part 2

General P r o v i s i o n s
Title
Definitions
Proceedings governed by other
law
Application to Indian tribes
International application of
chapter
Binding force of child custody
determination
Priority
Notice to persons outside state
Appearance and limited immu
nity
Communication between courts
Taking testimony in another
state

Jurisdiction
78 45c 201
78 45c 202
78 45c 203
78 45c 204
78 45c 205
78 45c 206
78 45c 207
78 45c 208
78 45c 209

840

Initial child custody )»***§£
tion
"*
Exclusive, continuing jur
tion
Jurisdiction to modify defc
nation
Temporary emergency ju
tion
. m
Notice — Opportunity W J
heard — Joinder
*T
Simultaneous p r o c e e d i n g s
Inconvenient forum
Jurisdiction declined by
of conduct
Information to be submit
court

78-45c-102

JUDICIAL CODE

ping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 USCS
§ 1738A(c)(2)(A), 6 A.L.R.5th 1.
Significant connection jurisdiction of court to
modify foreign child custody decree under
§§ 3(a)(2) and 14(b) of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28
U.S.C.A. §§ 1738A(c)(2)(b) and 1738A(f)(l), 67
A.L.R.5th 1.
Home state jurisdiction of court to modify
foreign child custody decree under §§ 3(a)(1)
and 14(a)(2) of Uniform Child Custody Juris-

78-45c-102.

diction Act (UCCJA) and Parental Kidnapping
Prevention
Act
(PKPA),
28
U.S.C.A.
§§ 1738A(c)(2)(A)
and
1738A(f)(l),
72
A.L.R.5th 249.
Declining jurisdiction to modify prior child
custody decree under § 14(a)(1) of Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA)
28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(f )(2), 73 A.L.R.5th 185.
Appealability of interlocutory or pendente
lite order for temporary child custody, 82
A.L.R.5th 389.

Definitions.

As used in this chapter:
(1) "Abandoned" means left without provision for reasonable and necessary care or supervision.
(2) "Child" means an individual under 18 years of age and not married.
(3) "Child custody determination" means a judgment, decree, or other
order of a court providing for the legal custody, physical custody, or
parent-time with respect to a child. The term includes a permanent,
temporary, initial, and modification order. The term does not include an
order relating to child support or other monetary obligation of an individual.
(4) "Child custody proceeding" means a proceeding in which legal
custody, physical custody, or parent-time with respect to a child is an issue.
The term includes a proceeding for divorce, separation, neglect, abuse,
dependency, guardianship, paternity, termination of parental rights, and
protection from domestic violence, in which the issue may appear. The
term does not include a proceeding involving juvenile delinquency, contractual emancipation, or enforcement under Part 3, Enforcement.
(5) "Commencement" means the filing of the first pleading in a proceeding.
(6) "Court" means an entity authorized under the law of a state to
establish, enforce, or modify a child custody determination.
(7) "Home state" means the state in which a child lived with a parent or
a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding. In the case
of a child less than six months of age, the term means the state in which
the child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned. A period of
temporary absence of any of the mentioned persons is part of the period.
(8) "Initial determination" means the first child custody determination
concerning a particular child.
(9) "Issuing court" means the court that makes a child custody determination for which enforcement is sought under this chapter.
(10) "Issuing state" means the state in which a child custody determination is made.
(11) "Modification" means a child custody determination that change*
replaces, supersedes, or is otherwise made after a previous ^ e t e n n ^ a 5 L *
concerning the same child, whether or not it is made by the court
made the previous determination.
(12) "Person" includes government, governmental subdivision,
or instrumentality, or any other legal or commercial entity.
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(13) "Person acting as a parent" means a person, other than a parent,
who:
(a) has physical custody of the child or has had physical custody for
a period of six consecutive months, including any temporary absence,
within one year immediately before the commencement of a child
custody proceeding; and
(b) has been awarded legal custody by a court or claims a right to
legal custody under the law of this state.
(14) "Physical custody" means the physical care and supervision of a
child.
(15) "State" means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or
insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
(16) "Tribe" means an Indian tribe, or band, or Alaskan Native village
which is recognized by federal law or formally acknowledged by a state.
(17) "Writ of assistance" means an order issued by a court authorizing
law enforcement officers to take physical custody of a child.
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-102, e n a c t e d by
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 2; 2001, c h . 255, § 36.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 2001 amendment, effective April 30, 2001, substituted "par-

ent-time" for "visitation" in Subsections (3) and
(4)
Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch 247,
§ 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Custody proceeding.
Voluntary termination of adoptive father's
parental rights in, and obligations to, child was

not custody issue under this chapter T B v
M M.J., 908 P2d 345 (Utah Ct. App 1995).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AX.R. — What types of proceedings or determinations are governed by the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) or the

Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA),
78 A.L R 4th 1028

78-45c-103. Proceedings governed by other law.
This chapter does not govern:
(1) an adoption proceeding; or
(2) a proceeding pertaining to the authorization of emergency medical
care for a child.
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-103, e n a c t e d by
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 3.

Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch 247,
§ 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000

78-45c-104. Application to Indian tribes.
(1) A child custody proceeding t h a t pertains to an Indian child as defined in
the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq., is not subject to this
chapter to the extent that it is governed by the Indian Child Welfare Act.
(2) A court of this state shall treat a tribe as a state of the United States for
purposes of Part 1, General Provisions, and Part 2, Jurisdiction.
(3) A child custody determination made by a tribe under factual circumstances in substantial conformity with the jurisdictional standards of this
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chapter shall be recognized and enforced under the provisions of Part 3,
Enforcement.
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-104, e n a c t e d by
L. 2000 t ch. 247, § 4.

Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch 247,
§ 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Construction and application of
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25

U S C A §§ 1901 et seq ) upon child custody
determinations, 89 A L R 5th 195

78-45c-105. International application of chapter,
(1) A court of this state shall treat a foreign country as a state of the United
States for purposes of applying Part 1, General Provisions, and Part 2,
Jurisdiction.
(2) A child custody determination made in a foreign country under factual
circumstances in substantial conformity with the jurisdictional standards of
this chapter shall be recognized and enforced under Part 3, Enforcement.
(3) The court need not apply the provisions of this chapter when the child
custody law of the other country violates fundamental principles of human
rights.
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-105, e n a c t e d by
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 5.

Effective D a t e s . — Laws 2000, ch 247,
§ 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000

78-45c-106. Binding force of child custody determination.
A child custody determination made by a court of this state that had
jurisdiction under this chapter binds all persons who have been served in
accordance with the laws of this state or notified in accordance with Section
78-45c-108 or who have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, and who
have been given an opportunity to be heard. The determination is conclusive as
to them as to all decided issues of law and fact except to the extent the
determination is modified.
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-106, e n a c t e d by
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 6.

78-45c-107.

Effective D a t e s . — Laws 2000, ch 247,
§ 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000

Priority.

If a question of existence or exercise of jurisdiction under this chapter is
raised in a child custody proceeding, the question, upon request of a party,
shall be given priority on the calendar and handled expeditiously
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-107, e n a c t e d by
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 7.

Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch 247,
§ 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000.

78-45c-108. Notice to persons outside state.
(1) Notice required for the exercise of jurisdiction when a person is outs*f*
this state may be given m a manner prescribed by the law of this state ™* ^
service of process or by the law of the state in which the service is made. No
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shall be given in a manner reasonably calculated to give actual notice, but may
be by publication if other means are not effective.
(2) Proof of service may be made in the manner prescribed by the law of this
state or by the law of the state in which the service is made.
(3) Notice is not required for the exercise of jurisdiction with respect to a
person who submits to the jurisdiction of the court.
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-108, enacted by
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 8.
Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch 247,

§ 42 makes the act effective on Jul\ 1, 2000
Cross-References. — Service of process.
Rule 4 , U R C P

78-45c-109. Appearance and limited immunity,
(1) A party to a child custody proceeding who is not subject to personal
jurisdiction in this state and is a responding party under Part 2, Jurisdiction,
a party in a proceeding to modify a child custody determination under Part 2,
Jurisdiction, or a petitioner in a proceeding to enforce or register a child
custody determination under Part 3, Enforcement, may appear and participate
in the proceeding without submitting to personal jurisdiction over the party for
another proceeding or purpose.
(2) A party is not subject to personal jurisdiction in this state solely by being
physically present for the purpose of participating in a proceeding under this
chapter. If a party is subject to personal jurisdiction in this state on a basis
other than physical presence, the party may be served with process in this
state. If a party present in this state is subject to the jurisdiction of another
state, service of process allowable under the laws of that state may be
accomplished in this state.
(3) The immunity granted by this section does not extend to civil litigation
based on acts unrelated to the participation in a proceeding under this chapter
committed by an individual while present in this state.
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-109, enacted by
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 9.

Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch 247,
§ 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000

78-45c-110. Communication between courts.
(1) A court of this state may communicate with a court in another state
concerning a proceeding arising under this chapter.
(2) The court may allow the parties to participate in the communication. If
the parties are not able to participate in the communication, the parties shall
be given the opportunity to present facts and legal arguments before a decision
on jurisdiction is made.
(3) A communication between courts on schedules, calendars, court records,
and similar matters may occur without informing the parties. A record need
not be made of that communication.
(4) Except as provided in Subsection (3), a record shall be made of the
communication. The parties shall be informed promptly of the communication
and granted access to the record.
(5) For the purposes of this section, "record" means information that is
inscribed on a tangible medium or that which is stored in an electronic or other
medium and is retrievable in perceivable form. A record includes notes or
transcripts of a court reporter who listened to a conference call between the
courts, an electronic recording of a telephone call, a memorandum or an
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electronic record of the communication between the courts, or a memorandum
or an electronic record made by a court after the communication.
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-110, enacted by
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 10.

78-45c-lll.

Effective D a t e s . — Laws 2000, ch 247,
§ 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000

Taking testimony in another state.

(1) In addition to other procedures available to a party, a party to a child
custody proceeding may offer testimony of witnesses who are located in
another state, including testimony of the parties and the child, by deposition or
other means allowable in this state for testimony taken in another state. The
court on its own motion may order that the testimony of a person be taken in
another state and may prescribe the manner in which and the terms upon
which the testimony is taken.
(2) A court of this state may permit an individual residing in another state
to be deposed or to testify by telephone, audiovisual means, or other electronic
means before a designated court or at another location in that state. A court of
this state shall cooperate with courts of other states in designating an
appropriate location for the deposition or testimony.
(3) Documentary evidence transmitted from another state to a court of this
state by technological means that do not produce an original writing may not
be excluded from evidence on an objection based on the means of transmission.
History: C. 1953, 7 8 - 4 5 c - l l l , enacted by
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 11.

Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch 247,
§ 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000

78-45c-112, Cooperation between courts — Preservation
of records.
( D A court of this state may request the appropriate court of another state
to:
(a) hold an evidentiary hearing;
(b) order a person to produce or give evidence under procedures of that
state;
(c) order that an evaluation be made with respect to the custody of a
child involved in a pending proceeding;
(d) forward to the court of this state a certified copy of the transcript of
the record of the hearing, the evidence otherwise presented, and any
evaluation prepared in compliance with the request; and
(e) order a party to a child custody proceeding or any person having
physical custody of the child to appear in the proceeding with or without
the child.
(2) Upon request of a court of another state, a court of this state may:
(a) hold a hearing or enter an order described in Subsection (1); <>r
(b) order a person in this state to appear alone or with the child in a
custody proceeding in another state.
(3) A court of this state may condition compliance with a request unae
Subsection (2Kb) upon assurance by the other state that travel and other
necessary expenses will be advanced or reimbursed. If the person who n
physical custody of the child cannot be served or fails to obey the order, or
846
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appears the order will be ineffective, the court may issue a warrant of arrest
against the person to secure his appearance with the child in the other state.
(4) Travel and other necessary and reasonable expenses incurred under
Subsections (1) and (2) may be assessed against the parties according to the
law of this state.
(5) A court of this state shall preserve the pleadings, orders, decrees, records
of hearings, evaluations, and other pertinent records with respect to a child
custody proceeding until the child attains 18 years of age. Upon appropriate
request by a court or law enforcement official of another state, the court shall
forward a certified copy of these records.
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-U2, enacted by
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 12.

Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch 247,
*? 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000.

PART 2
JURISDICTION
78-45c-201. Initial child custody jurisdiction.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 78-45c-204, a court of this state
has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if:
(a) this state is the home state of the child on the date of the
commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child
within six months before the commencement of the proceeding and the
child is absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent
continues to live in this state;
(b) a court of another state does not have jurisdiction under Subsection
(l)(a), or a court of the home state of the child has declined to exercise
jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the more appropriate forum
under Section 78-45c-207 or 78-45c-208; and
(i) the child and the child's parents, or the child and at least one
parent or a person acting as a parent have a significant connection
with this state other than mere physical presence; and
(ii) substantial evidence is available in this state concerning the
child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships;
(c) all courts having jurisdiction under Subsection (l)(a) or (b) have
declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground t h a t a court of this state is
the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child under
Section 78-45c-207 or 78-45c-208; or
(d) no state would have jurisdiction under Subsection (l)(a), (b), or (c).
(2) Subsection (1) is the exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a child
custody determination by a court of this state.
(3) Physical presence of, or personal jurisdiction over, a party or a child is
neither necessary nor sufficient to make a child custody determination.
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-201, enacted by
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 13.

Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247,
§ 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
A N AL\

sis

Appropriate forum.
Concurrent jurisdiction.
Preferred forum.
Appropriate forum.
Utah district court appropriately retained
jurisdiction under the Utah Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act to make any determinations regarding custody, visitation or other
matters relevant to the children, where the
parents were divorced in Utah and, although
the mother had taken the children to Washington, that state specifically declined to exercise
jurisdiction because of Utah's past and present
involvement with the matter Rawlings v
Weiner, 752 P.2d 1327 (Utah Ct. App ), cert,
denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988).
This chapter does not give a preference to the
"home state." The significant connection or substantial connection basis comes into play either
when the home state test cannot be met or as
an alternative to that test. In re W.D. v. Drake,
770 P.2d 1011 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 789
P.2d 33 (Utah 1989).
Even though a certain state may be the
"home state," if the child and his family have
equal or stronger ties with another state that
other state also has jurisdiction. In re WD. v
Drake, 770 P.2d 1011 (Utah Ct. App), cert
denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1989).
Judge did not abuse his discretion in deciding
that California was the more appropriate and
convenient forum to litigate custody and in
granting the state's motion to dismiss the nat-

ural parents' petition, where substantial information concerning the parents' abilities and
past history was in California, the mother had
only recently come to Utah but had lived for
years in California, and the parents' purpose in
coming to Utah was to shop for jurisdiction. In
re W.D. v. Drake, 770 P.2d 1011 (Utah Ct. App.),
cert, denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1989)
The state that made the original custody
determination has exclusive continuing jurisdiction over the custody issue until that state
loses or declines to exercise its jurisdiction.
Crump v. Crump, 821 P.2d 1172 (Utah Ct. App.
1991), cert, granted, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992)
Concurrent jurisdiction.
Utah had concurrent jurisdiction to modify a
child custody order from another state when it
was in the best interest of the child for Utah to
assume jurisdiction because the child and at
least one parent had a significant connection
with Utah and there was substantive evidence
in Utah pertaining to the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships.
Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157 (Utah Ct. App.
1992).
Preferred forum.
In child custody matters, continuing jurisdiction of court in which divorce decree originated
is intended to remain exclusive, even if other
states have come to satisfy one or more of the
criteria of this section, unless the decree state
decides not to exercise it. Liska v. Liska, 902
P.2d 644 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AX.R. — Significant connection jurisdiction
of court under § 3(a)(2) of the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28
USCS § 1738A(c)(2)(B), 5 A.L.R.5th 550.
Abandonment and emergency jurisdiction of
court under § 3(a)(3) of the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28
USCS § 1738(c)(2)(C), 5 A.L.R 5th 788

Home state jurisdiction of court under
§ 3(a)(1) of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) or the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 USCS § 1738A
(c)(2)(A), 6 A.L.R.5th 1
Default jurisdiction of court under § (a)(4) of
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
(UCCJA) or the Parental Kidnapping P ^ f n "
tion Act (PKPA), 28 USCS § 1738A(c)(2)(D), 6
A.L.R.5th 69.

78-45c-202. Exclusive, continuing jurisdiction,
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 78-45c-204, a court of this^t*>
that has made a child custody determination consistent with Section 7o
201 or 78-45c-203 has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determination until:
h'\Aan&
(a) a court of this state determines that neither the child, the c . - ^ j
one parent, nor the child and a person acting as a parent have a sigm
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connection with this state and that substantial evidence is no longer
available in this state concerning the child's care, protection, training, and
personal relationships; or
(b) a court of this state or a court of another state determines that
neither the child, nor a parent, nor any person acting as a parent presently
resides in this state.
(2) A court of this state that has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under this
section may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if the court determines that it is
an inconvenient forum under Section 78-45c-207.
(3) A court of this state t h a t has made a child custody determination and
does not have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under this section may modify
that determination only if it has jurisdiction to make an initial determination
under Section 78-45c-201.
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-202, enacted by
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 14.

Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch 247,
§ 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000

78-45c-203. Jurisdiction to modify determination.
Except as otherwise provided in Section 78-45c-204, a court of this state may
not modify a child custody determination made by a court of another state
unless a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial determination
under Subsection 78-45c-201(l)(a) or (b) and:
(1) the court of the other state determines it no longer has exclusive,
continuing jurisdiction under Section 78-45c-202 or that a court of this
state would be a more convenient forum under Section 78-45c-207; or
(2) a court of this state or a court of the other state determines that
neither the child, nor a parent, nor any person acting as a parent presently
resides in the other state.
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-203, enacted by
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 15.

Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch 247,
§ 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000

78-45c-204. Temporary emergency jurisdiction.
(1) A court of this state has temporary emergency jurisdiction if the child is
present in this state and the child has been abandoned or it is necessary in an
emergency to protect the child because the child, or a sibling or parent of the
child, is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse.
(2) If there is no previous child custody determination that is entitled to be
enforced under this chapter, and if no child custody proceeding has been
commenced in a court of a state having jurisdiction under Sections 78-45c-201
through 78-45c-203, a child custody determination made under this section
remains in effect until an order is obtained from a court of a state having
jurisdiction under Sections 78-45c-201 through 78-45c-203. If a child custody
proceeding has not been or is not commenced in a court of a state having
jurisdiction under Sections 78-45c-201 through 78-45c-203, a child custody
determination made under this section becomes a final determination, if:
(a) it so provides; and
(b) this state becomes the home state of the child.
(3) If there is a previous child custody determination that is entitled to be
enforced under this chapter, or a child custody proceeding has been commenced
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in a court of a state having jurisdiction under Sections 78-45c-201 through
78-45c-203, any order issued by a court of this state under this section shall
specify in the order a period of time which the court considers adequate to
allow the person seeking an order to obtain an order from the state having
jurisdiction under Sections 78-45c-201 through 78-45c-203. The order issued in
this state remains in effect until an order is obtained from the other state
within the period specified or the period expires.
(4) A court of this state t h a t has been asked to make a child custody
determination under this section, upon being informed t h a t a child custody
proceeding has been commenced, or a child custody determination has been
made, by a court of a state having jurisdiction under Sections 78-45c-201
through 78-45c-203, shall immediately communicate with the other court. A
court of this state that is exercising jurisdiction pursuant to Sections 78-45c201 through 78-45c-203, upon being informed that a child custody proceeding
has been commenced, or a child custody determination has been made by a
court of another state under a statute similar to this section shall immediately
communicate with the court of t h a t state. The purpose of the communication is
to resolve the emergency, protect the safety of the parties and the child, and
determine a period for the duration of the temporary order.
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-204, e n a c t e d by
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 16.

Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247,
§ 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
_
Emergency jurisdiction.
- P e r m a n e n t custody.
E m e r g e n c y jurisdiction.
Emergency jurisdiction under Subsection
(l)(c) is reserved for extraordinary circumstances. Emergency jurisdiction should be limited to those cases of neglect where the harm is
immediate or imminent. In re D.S.K., 792 P.2d

118 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (decided under former
§ 78-45c-3).
- P e r m a n e n t custody.
An assumption of emergency jurisdiction is
an assumption of temporary jurisdiction only; it
does not confer upon the state the authority to
make a permanent custody disposition. In re
D.S.K., 792 P.2d 118 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
(decided under former § 78-45c-3).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Emergency jurisdiction of court
under §§ 3(aK3)(u) and 14(a) of Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act and Parental Kidnapping Prevention
Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §§

1738A(c)(2)(C)(ii) and 1738A(f), to protect foterests of child notwithstanding existence of
prior, valid custody decree rendered by another
state, 80 A L.R.5th 117.

78-45c-205. Notice — Opportunity to be heard — Joinder.
(1) Before a child custody determination is made under this chapter, notice
and an opportunity to be heard in accordance with the standards of ^ e 5;|°
78-45c-108 shall be given to all persons entitled to notice under the law oftftw
state as in child custody proceedings between residents of this state,
/
parent whose parental rights have not been previously terminated, an
person having physical custody of the child.
. J (2) This chapter does not govern the enforceability of a child c
determination made without notice and an opportunity to be heard.
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(3) The obligation to join a party and the right to intervene as a party in a
child custody proceeding under this chapter are governed by the law of this
state as in child custody proceedings between residents of this state.
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-205, enacted by
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 17.

Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247,
§ 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000.

7g_45c-206. Simultaneous proceedings,
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 78-45c-204, a court of this state
may not exercise its jurisdiction under this chapter if at the time of the
commencement of the proceeding a proceeding concerning the custody of the
child had been previously commenced in a court of another state having
jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this chapter, unless the proceeding has been terminated or is stayed by the court of the other state because a
court of this state is a more convenient forum under Section 78-45c-207.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in Section 78-45c-204, a court of this state,
before hearing a child custody proceeding, shall examine the court documents
and other information supplied by the parties pursuant to Section 78-45c-209.
If the court determines that a child custody proceeding was previously
commenced in a court in another state having jurisdiction substantially in
accordance with this chapter, the court of this state shall stay its proceeding
and communicate with the court of the other state. If the court of the state
having jurisdiction substantially in accordance with this chapter does not
determine that the court of this state is a more appropriate forum, the court of
this state shall dismiss the proceeding.
(3) In a proceeding to modify a child custody determination, a court of this
state shall determine whether a proceeding to enforce the determination has
been commenced in another state. If a proceeding to enforce a child custody
determination has been commenced in another state, the court may:
(a) stay the proceeding for modification pending the entry of an order of
a court of the other state enforcing, staying, denying, or dismissing the
proceeding for enforcement;
(b) enjoin the parties from continuing with the proceeding for enforcement; or
(c) proceed with the modification under conditions it considers appropriate.
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-206, enacted by
L. 2000, ch, 247, § 18.

Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247,
§ 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Exercise of jurisdiction.
— Hearing.
Pending foreign proceeding.
—Stay of Utah action.
Proceedings elsewhere.
— Due process.

Exercise of jurisdiction.
—Hearing.
When a mother and child living in Utah
sought relief in Utah from an Ohio custody
order being enforced in Utah by her husband,
the district court erred in refusing to hold a
hearing to examine whether, under §§ 78-45c-
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14 and 78-45c-6, jurisdiction should be exercised by the Utah court Given the policy considerations behind this chapter, the district
court, at the very least, should have stayed its
determination until after it held a hearing to
determine whether jurisdiction should have
been exercised. Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157
(Utah Ct. App. 1992).
P e n d i n g foreign p r o c e e d i n g .
—Stay of U t a h action.
Utah district court, after learning of prior
guardianship proceedings in Oregon, was required to stay a Utah action seeking to determine child custody and to communicate with
the Oregon court to determine the propriety of
further proceedings in Oregon, so that the
issues could be litigated in the more appropriate forum, where the child resided in Oregon at
the time and the Oregon court had appointed

the child's grandparents as guardians. Coppedge v Harding, 714 P2d 1121 (Utah 1985)
Proceedings elsewhere.
Where grandparents in Oregon, with whom
child was visiting, had won custody in Oregon
court, Utah district court was required to stay
parents' proceeding seeking custody determination and to communicate with Oregon court to
determine the propriety of further proceedings
in Oregon. Coppedge v. Harding, 714 P.2d 1121
(Utah 1985).
—Due process.
A mother was denied her due process rights
by the trial court's enforcement of a foreigncustody modification judgment which had questionable jurisdictional validity without giving
the mother reasonable notice and opportunity
to be heard. Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157
(Utah Ct. App. 1992).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — What types of proceedings or determinations are governed by the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) or the
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA),
78 A.L.R.4th 1028.
Default jurisdiction of court under § (a)(4) of
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
(UCCJA) or the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 USCS § 1738A (c)(2)(D), 6
A.L.R5th69.
Pending proceeding in another state as
ground for declining jurisdiction under § 6(a) of
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
(UCCJA) or the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 USCS § 1738A(g), 20
A.L.R.5th 700.
Significant connection jurisdiction of court to
modify foreign child custody decree under

§§ 3(a)(2) and 14(b) of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28
U.S.C.A. §§ 1738A(c)(2)(b) and 1738A(f)(l), 67
A.L.R.5th 1.
Home state jurisdiction of court to modify
foreign child custody decree under §§ 3(a)(1)
and 14(a)(2) of Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C.A. §§
1738A(c)(2)(A) and 1738A(f)(l), 72 A.L.R.5th
249.
Declining jurisdiction to modify prior child
custody decree under § 14(a)(1) of Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA),
28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(f )(2), 73 A.L.R.5th 185.

78-45c-207, Inconvenient forum,
(1) A court of this state that has jurisdiction under this chapter to make a
child custody determination may decline to exercise its jurisdiction at any time
if it determines that it is an inconvenient forum under the circumstances and
that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum. The issue ot
inconvenient forum may be raised upon the court's own motion, request oi
another court, or motion of a party.
.
(2) Before determining whether it is an inconvenient forum, a court of tnis
state shall consider whether it is appropriate t h a t a court of another sta
exercise jurisdiction. For this purpose, the court shall allow the parties to
submit information and shall consider all relevant factors, including:
(a) whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to continu
the future and which state could best protect the parties and the cruiOi
(b) the length of time the child has resided outside this state;
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(c) the distance between the court in this state and the court in the state
that would assume jurisdiction;
(d) the relative financial circumstances of the parties;
(e) any agreement of the parties as to which state should assume
jurisdiction;
(f) the nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the
pending litigation, including the testimony of the child;
(g) the ability of the court of each state to decide the issue expeditiously
and the procedures necessary to present the evidence; and
(h) the familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and issues of
the pending litigation.
(3) If a court of this state determines t h a t it is an inconvenient forum and
that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum, it shall stay the
proceedings upon condition that a child custody proceeding be promptly
commenced in another designated state and may impose any other condition
the court considers just and proper.
(4) A court of this state may decline to exercise its jurisdiction under this
chapter if a child custody determination is incidental to an action for divorce or
another proceeding while still retaining jurisdiction over the divorce or other
proceeding.
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-207, enacted by
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 19.

Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247,
§ 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000.

78-45c-208. Jurisdiction declined by reason of conduct.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 78-45c-204 or by other law of
this state, if a court of this state has jurisdiction under this chapter because a
person invoking the jurisdiction has engaged in unjustifiable conduct, the
court shall decline to exercise its jurisdiction unless:
(a) the parents and all persons acting as parents have acquiesced in the
exercise of jurisdiction;
(b) a court of the state otherwise having jurisdiction under Sections
78-45c-201 through 78-45c-203 determines that this state is a more
appropriate forum under Section 78-45c-207; or
(c) no other state would have jurisdiction under Sections 78-45c-201
through 78-45c-203.
(2) If a court of this state declines to exercise its jurisdiction pursuant to
Subsection (1), it may fashion an appropriate remedy to ensure the safety of
the child and prevent a repetition of the wrongful conduct, including staying
the proceeding until a child custody proceeding is commenced in a court having
jurisdiction under Sections 78-45c-201 through 78-45c-203.
(3) If a court dismisses a petition or stays a proceeding because it declines
to exercise its jurisdiction pursuant to Subsection (1), it shall charge the party
invoking the jurisdiction of the court with necessary and reasonable expenses
including costs, communication expenses, attorney's fees, investigative fees,
expenses for witnesses, travel expenses, and child care during the course of the
proceedings, unless the party from whom fees are sought establishes t h a t the
award would be clearly inappropriate. The court may not assess fees, costs, or
expenses against this state except as otherwise provided by law other t h a n this
chapter.
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History: C. 1953, 78-45c-208, e n a c t e d by
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 20.

Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch 247,
§ 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000

78-45c-209. Information to be submitted to court.
(1) In a child custody proceeding, each party, in its first pleading or in an
attached affidavit, shall give information, if reasonably ascertainable, under
oath as to the child's present address, the places where the child has lived
during the last five years, and the names and present addresses of the persons
with whom the child has lived during that period. The pleading or affidavit
shall state whether the party:
(a) has participated, as a party or witness or in any other capacity, in
any other proceeding concerning the custody of or parent-time with the
child and, if so, identify the court, the case number of the proceeding, and
the date of the child custody determination, if any;
(b) knows of any proceeding t h a t could affect the current proceeding,
including proceedings for enforcement and proceedings relating to domestic violence, protective orders, termination of parental rights, and adoptions and, if so, identify the court and the case number and the nature of
the proceeding; and
(c) knows the names and addresses of any person not a party to the
proceeding who has physical custody of the child or claims rights of legal
custody or physical custody of, or parent-time with, the child and, if so, the
names and addresses of those persons.
(2) If the information required by Subsection (1) is not furnished, the court,
upon its own motion or that of a party, may stay the proceeding until the
information is furnished.
(3) If the declaration as to any of the items described in Subsection (1) is in
the affirmative, the declarant shall give additional information under oath as
required by the court. The court may examine the parties under oath as to
details of the information furnished and other matters pertinent to the court's
jurisdiction and the disposition of the case.
(4) Each party has a continuing duty to inform the court of any proceeding
in this or any other state that could affect the current proceeding.
(5) If a party alleges in an affidavit or a pleading under oath t h a t the health,
safety, or liberty of a party or child would be put at risk by the disclosure of
identifying information, that information shall be sealed and not disclosed to
the other party or the public unless the court orders the disclosure to be made
after a hearing in which the court takes into consideration the health, safety,
or liberty of the party or child and determines that the disclosure is in the
interest of justice.
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-209, e n a c t e d by
L. 2000, ch. 247, *> 21; 2001, ch. 255, § 37.
A m e n d m e n t Notes. — The 2001 amend
ment, effective April 30, 2001, substituted "par-

ent-time" for "visitation" in Subsections (l)(a)
and (c)
Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch 247,
§ 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000

78-45c-210. Appearance of parties and child.
(1) A court of this state may order a party to a child custody proceeding w o
is in this state to appear before the court personally with or without the cm The court may order any person who is in this state and who has physi
custody or control of the child to appear physically with the child.
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(2) If a party to a child custody proceeding whose presence is desired by the
court is outside this state, the court may order that a notice given pursuant to
Section 78-45c-108 include a statement directing the party to appear personally with or without the child and declaring that failure to appear may result
in a decision adverse to the party.
(3) The court may enter any orders necessary to ensure the safety of the
child and of any person ordered to appear under this section
(4) If a party to a child custody proceeding who is outside this state is
directed to appear under Subsection (2) or desires to appear personally before
the court with or without the child, the court may require another party to pay
reasonable and necessary travel and other expenses of the party so appearing
and of the child.
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-210, enacted by
L. 2000, ch. 247, <? 22.

Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch 247,
§ 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000

PART 3
ENFORCEMENT
78-45c-301.

Definitions.

As used in this part:
(1) "Petitioner" means a person who seeks enforcement of a child
custody determination or enforcement of an order for the return of the
child under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction.
(2) "Respondent" means a person against whom a proceeding has been
commenced for enforcement of a child custody determination or enforcement of an order for the return of the child under the Hague Convention
on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-301, enacted by
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 23.

Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch 247,
§ 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000.

78-45c-302. Scope — Hague Convention Enforcement.
This chapter may be invoked to enforce:
(1) a child custody determination; and
(2) an order for the return of the child made under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-302, enacted by
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 24.

Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch 247,
§ 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000

78-45c-303. Duty to enforce.
(1) A court of this state shall recognize and enforce a child custody
determination of a court of another state if the latter court exercised jurisdiction t h a t was in substantial conformity with this chapter or the determination
was made under factual circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of
this chapter and the determination has not been modified in accordance with
this chapter.
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Full faith and credit given to child custody determinations

(a) The apptopuate authorities of every State shall enforce according to its tet ms and shall not modify except as provided in subsection (f) of this section an) child custody determination made consistently with the provisions of this section by a court of another State
(b) As used in this section, the term—
(1) 'child means a person under the age of eighteen,
(2) ' contestant' means a person, including a parent, who
claims a right to custody or visitation of a child,
(3) custody determination" means a judgment, decree, or
other order of a court providing for the custody or visitation of a
child, and includes permanent and temporary orders, and initial
orders and modifications,
(4) 'home State" means the State in which, immediately
preceding the time involved, the child lived with his parents, a
parent or a person acting as parent, for at least six consecutive
T28USCA SS1651 1860 8TH Vol
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months, and in the case of a child less than six months old, the
State in which the child lived from birth with any of such
persons. Periods of temporary absence of any of such persons
are counted as part of the six-month or other period;
(5) "modification" and "modify" refer to a custody determination which modifies, replaces, supersedes, or otherwise is made
subsequent to, a prior custody determination concerning the
same child, whether made by the same court or not;
(6) "person acting as a parent" means a person, other than a
parent, who has physical custody of a child and who has either
been awarded custody by a court or claims a right to custody;
(7) "physical custody" means actual possession and control of
a child; and
(8) "State" means a State of the United States, the District of
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or a territory or
possession of the United States.
(c) A child custody determination made by a court of a State is
consistent with the provisions of this section only if—
(1) such court has jurisdiction under the law of such State;
and
(2) one of the following conditions is met:
(A) such State (i) is the home State of the child on the
date of the commencement of the proceeding, or (ii) had
been the child's home State within six months before the
date of the commencement of the proceeding and the child
is absent from such State because of his removal or reten-j
tion by a contestant or for other reasons, and a contestant^
continues to live in such State;
(B) (i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiC
tion under subparagraph (A), and (ii) it is in the best inter
of the child that a court of such State assume jurisdictiC
because (I) the child and his parents, or the child and
least one contestant, have a significant connection with sir
State other than mere physical presence in such State,
(II) there is available in such State substantial evidefl
concerning the child's present or future care, protec
training, and personal relationships;
(C) the child is physically present in such State and W^
child has been abandoned, or (ii) it is necessary
emergency to protect the child because he has been s
ed to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse;
(D) (i) it appears that no other State would have jv
tion under subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (E), °
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CHILD CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS

28 § 1738A

State has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that
the State whose jurisdiction is in issue is the more appropriate forum to determine the custod\ of the child, and (n) it is
in the best interest of the child that such court assume
jurisdiction, or
(E) the court has continuing jurisdiction pursuant to sub
section (d) of this section
Hd) The jurisdiction of a court of a State
"stody determination consistently with the
Mitinues as long as the requirement of
rtion continues to be met and such State
he child or of any contestant

which has made a child
provisions of this section
subsection (c)(1) of this
remains the residence of

(e) Before a child custody determination is made, reasonable noTtice and opportunity to be heard shall be given to the contestants, any
parent whose parental rights have not been previously terminated
and any person who has physical custody of a child
(f) A court of a State may modify a determination of the custody of
the same child made by a court of another State, if—
(1) it has jurisdiction to make such a child custody determination, and
(2) the court of the other State no longer has jurisdiction, or it
has declined to exercise such jurisdiction to modify such determination
(g) A court of a State shall not exercise jurisdiction in any proceeding for a custody determination commenced during the pendency of
a proceeding in a court of another State where such court of that
other State is exercising jurisdiction consistently with the provisions
of this section to make a custody deteimination
(Added Pub L 96-611 § 8(a), Dec 28, 1980 94 Stat 3569)

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Congressional Findings and Declaration
of Purpose
Section 7 of Pub L 96-611 provided
that
(a) The Congress finds that—
(1) there is a large and growing
number of cases annually involving dis
putes between persons claiming rights
of custody and visitation of children
under the laws and in the courts of
different States the District of Columbia the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
and the territories and possessions of
the United States
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(2) the laws and practices by which
the couits of those jurisdictions deter
mine their jurisdiction to decide such
disputes and the effect to be given the
decisions of such disputes by the courts
of othei jurisdictions are often incon
sistent and conflicting
(3) those characteristics of the law
and practice in such cases along with
the limits imposed by a Federal system
on the authority of each such junsdic
tion to conduct investigations and take
other actions outside its own bound
anes contribute to a tendency of par
ties involved in such disputes to fre
quently resort to the seizure restraint

28 §1738A

EVIDENCE; DOCUMENTARY

concealment, and interstate transportation of children, the disregard of court
orders, excessive relitigation of cases,
obtaining of conflicting orders by the
courts of various jurisdictions, and interstate travel and communication that
is so expensive and time consuming as
to disrupt their occupations and commercial activities; and
"(4) among the results of those conditions and activities are the failure of
the courts of such jurisdictions to give
full faith and credit to the judicial proceedings of the other jurisdictions, the
deprivation of rights of liberty and
property without due process of law,
burdens on commerce among such jurisdictions and with foreign nations, and
harm to the welfare of children and
their parents and other custodians.
"(b) For those reasons it is necessary
to establish a national system for locating
parents and children who travel from one
such jurisdiction to another and are concealed in connection with such disputes,
and to establish national standards under
which the courts of such jurisdictions will
determine their jurisdiction to decide
such disputes and the effect to be given
by each such jurisdiction to such decisions by the courts of other such jurisdictions.
"(c) The general purposes of sections 6
to 10 of this Act [enacting this section and
sections 654(17) and 663 of Title 42, The
Public Health and Welfare, amending
section 655(a) of Title 42, and enacting
provisions set out as notes under this
section and sections 663 and 1305 of Title
42 and 1073 of Title 18, Crimes and
Criminal Procedure] are to—
"(1) promote cooperation between
State courts to the end that a determination of custody and visitation is rendered in the State which can best decide the case in the interest of the
child;
"(2) promote and
change of information
of mutual assistance
which are concerned
child;

expand the exand other forms
between States
with the same

"(3) facilitate the enforcement of
custody and visitation decrees of sister
States;
"(4) discourage continuing interstate
controversies over child custody in the
interest of greater stability of home environment and of secure family relationships for the child;
"(5) avoid jurisdictional competition
and conflict between State courts in
matters of child custody and visitation
which have in the past resulted in the
shifting of children from State to State
with harmful effects on their well-being; and
"(6) deter interstate abductions and
other unilateral removals of children
undertaken to obtain custody and visitation awards."
State Court Proceedings for Custody Determinations;
Priority
Treatment;
Fees, Costs, and Other Expenses
Section 8(c) of Pub.L. 96-611 provided
that: "In furtherance of the purposes of
section 1738A of title 28, United States
Code [this section], as added by subsection (a) of this section, State courts are
encouraged to—
"(1) afford priority to proceedings
for custody determinations; and
"(2) award to the person entitled to
custody or visitation pursuant to a custody determination which is consistent
with the provisions of such section
1738A [this section], necessary travel
expenses, attorneys' fees, costs of private investigations, witness fees or^expenses, and other expenses incurred IlV
connection with such custody detennJjj
nation in any case in which—
"(A) a contestant has, without 1
consent of the person entitled to C
tody or visitation pursuant to a c"
dy determination which is consti
with the provisions of such
1738A [this section], (i) wron
removed the child from the Pn
custody of such person, or (iu 1
fully retained the child after a i
other temporary relinquishme
physical custody; or
"(B) the court determines it 1
propriate."

LIBRARY REFERENCES
American Digest System
Admissibility of public records and documents, and acts, records, and p
of other states, see Evidence <®=>331, 346 et seq.
Proceedings to determine right to custody of child, and enforcemen
order, see Parent and Child <£=>2(4) et seq.
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action usually, is just to have a written election from
them.

But since they're here and they're sitting in the

courtroom anyway, then we can just put them on the stand
and let them tell us what their preference is if the
parties don't have any objection.
But

why

don't

we

hear

from you

in the way

of

opening remarks if you have any, then let's put Mrs.
Kingdon or whoever you wish to call on the stand and
let's just briefly get the facts out about where the
children have lived and the fact pattern of how we've
come to be here in court.
And then Mr. Kingdon can ask questions and then we
can hear from Mr. Kingdon under oath as well and that
will give us —

me an opportunity to make some findings

of fact in this matter that may be helpful to everybodyf
Utah courts, Georgia courts, or anybody else who takes a
look at this.
MS.

Ms. Bolin, any remarks you want to make?

BOLIN:

Yes f

Your

Honor.

The

action

was

actually commenced because the child came to Georgia and
refused

to return to Utah.

And as a result of her

refusal, the mother filed a motion to change custody and
we notified the Court and asked for an ex parte because
time was of the essence.
return.

The child was scheduled to

The mother did not want to be in contempt.

And based on the facts as they were verified to me
11

by the child in question, we did file an ex parte.

The

father was served and subsequently, in accordance with
the

UCJEEA,

both

judges

from

both

states

had

conversation•
I believe that orders —

in fact, I know for a fact

that orders were issued by the state of Utah.

Roger

Livingston, the Honorable Superior Court Judge there, as
well as the Honorable Robert Russell concurred and both
agreed that jurisdiction should be placed in the Georgia
courts.
Since that time, Mr. Kingdon has filed appeals and
I understand

—

THE COURT:
MS.

BOLIN:

decision.
the Utah

Appeals?
Yes,

Your

Honor,

appeals

to

that

I understand that he's filed an appeal with
—

THE COURT:

Utah court?

MR. KINGDON:

With the Utah court, yes.

THE COURT:

Well, there's no appeal that's been

filed here.
MS. BOLIN:
Utah,

and

he

No, sir, but the Court of Appeals in
has

filed

an

appeal

there

on

the

jurisdictional issue alone.
THE

COURT:

Okay, very

well.

Call

your

first

witness.
12

1

MS- BOLIN:

Okay.

2

THE COURT:

Right up heref Mrs. Kingdon.

3

Plaintiff calls Linary Kingdon.

(WITNESS APPROACHES THE WITNESS STAND)

4

L I N A R Y

KINGDON,

having been d u l y sworn, t o o k t h e

5

stand and testified as follows:

6

DIRECT EXAMINATION

7

BY MS. BOLIN:

8

Q

Please state your name.

9

A

Linary Kingdon.

10

Q

You're

11
12

going

to

to

speak

up

a

little

bit

louder.
A

13

Is this on?
THE COURT:

It doesn't amplify.

14

so speak louder.

15

A

Linary Kingdon.

16

Q

(By Ms. Bolin: )

17

need

It just records,

And, Mrs. Kingdon, where do you

reside?

18

A

In Darien, Georgia.

19

Q

And how long have you resided in Georgia?

20

A

Total time?

21

Q

And by "total," what does that mean?

22

A

I lived in Kingsland from —

A little over six years.

in St. Marys from '91

23

to '94 and then relocated to Oregon for five years and then

24

moved back here in March of '99.

25

Q

So you've been here now a total of how many months
13

1

or years since your second return or your return back to

2

Georgia?

3

A

Okay.

4

Q

But did you live here at least six months prior to

5

Three years and five months.

filing this action?

6

A

Yes f almost two years.

7

Q

And you have two —

8

A

Two.

9

Q

And what are their names?

10

A

Julie and Stacy.

11

Q

And what are their birthdays?

12

A

Julie is July 11th, '86, and she's sixteen.

13

how many children do you have?

And

Stacy is March 5th, '88, and she is fourteen.

14

Q

And are those parties present?

15

A

Yes.

16

Q

Who has custody of those children?

17

A

Because of the recent things, I do.

18

Q

And the custody issue arose as a result of what?

19

I'll rephrase that.

Were you married to Mr. Kingdon?

20

A

Yes, from

21

Q

When were y'all divorced?

22

A

September 11th, 1989.

23

Q

And

24
25

at

—

the

time

of your

divorce, what

was

the

custody arrangement?
A

Joint custody and physical residency with me.
14

Q

And has that changed during the years?

A

It did in June of this year.

Q

And what was that change?

A

The change was to shift custody of Stacy to her

dad.
THE COURT:

That was June of this year?

MS. BOLIN:

June 11th, Your Honorf I believe.

THE WITNESS:

May or June?

MR. KINGDON:

June llthf Your Honor.

MS. BOLIN:

It was

MR. KINGDON:
THE COURT:

—

The order was entered June 11th.
In Utah?

MR. KINGDON:

In Utah, yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

And until

child been?

June

11th, where had the

With you?

THE WITNESS:

Back and forth mostly with me, but a

little bit with her dad when she wanted to live with
him.
THE

COURT:

And

where

was

the

child

going

to

school?
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

Depending where she lived.

She went to both schools?

MR. KINGDON:

Your Honor, both —

have lived with me at various times.
Stacy resided with me from July

both children
Most recently,

17th, 2001 until she
15

1

came out here to visit her mother June 4th, 2002.

2

she had been in Utah for nearly a year before the order

3

was entered in Utah.

4

Q

5

(By Ms. Bolin:)

So

During that time, Mrs. Kingdon,

who was the official custodial parent of Stacy?

6

A

I was•

7

Q

And as a result of your child visiting you this

8

summer, what happened?

9

A

She told me about the environment at home in Utah,

10

and it didn't sound like a healthy one at all and she didn't

11

want to return.

12

Q

And what was your response to that?

13

A

I needed to pursue legal help because I had just

14

shifted custody to her dad and I couldn't just make her stay

15

or —

16
17
18
19
20
21

I needed to follow the law.
Q

Were y'all represented by counsel when you filed

that consent order?
A

Brian did it, and at the time we were in agreement

with the situation as it was at that time.
Q
July or —

And were you in agreement with that order until
excuse me —

until June of this year?

22

A

To change custody?

23

Q

Uh-huh.

24

A

Right, as long as —

25

yeah, until I knew about other

things.
16

1

Q

2

your mind?

3

A

Exactly what did you learn that made you change

That Stacy was very stressed, and being in Utah the

4

worst part is that she had gotten to the point where she was

5

inflicting

6

suicide.

7
8
9
10

Q

bodily

injury

to

herself

and

had

At any point in time did you refuse to allow her to

return to Utah?
A

Never.

In fact, I encouraged her even sometimes

when she didn't want to go.

11

Q

In spite of the danger to herself?

12

A

Well, no.

13

contemplated

This time I didn't encourage her, but I

made sure that what she had told me was true.

14

Q

And how did you make sure of that?

15

A

Well,

I helped

—

made

sure

she understood

the

16

importance of the things she was saying, that if it wasn't

17

true, you know, that that's very bad.

18

she had told me, I contacted people in Utah that I could

19

follow through to verify that what she had said was true.

20

And then a lot of it just boils down to I had to believe her

21

or her dad, and from my experience, I'm much more able to

22

trust her.

23

Q

24
25

Is

it

—

is

it your

And some of the things

opinion

that

it's

in

the

child's best interest to remain in Georgia?
A

Yes.
17

1

MS, BOLIN:

2

THE COURT:

3

That's all f Your Honor.
Any questions, Mr. Kingdon, for Mrs.

Kingdon?

4

MR. KINGDON:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. KINGDON:

7

Yes, Your Honor.
You can stay seated if you'd like.
Yes f

sir.

Your Honor, should I be sworn in before

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. KINGDON:

10

—

You're asking questions right now.

THE COURT:

11

Okay.

Thank you.

You're not testifying.

You're asking

questions.

12

MR. KINGDON:

Yes, sir.

13

CROSS-EXAMINATION OF LINARY KINGDON

14

BY MR. KINGDON:

15
16

Thank you, Your Honor.

Q

Linary, can you tell the Court what evidence you

have that there was abuse in this case?

17

A

Can you

—

Her emotional demeanor when she was talking about

18

it.

19

evidence would be having talked to the assistant principal at

20

the school where she went when she asked to be taken into

21

protective —

22

Utah.

23

I did

Q

see

some

scars

on her wrists.

Non-physical

a protective situation to be away from home in

Those are the only ones I can think of right now.
Linary, did you provide this Court with a list of

24

the addresses where you have lived in the past five years and

25

also of the names of the people who Stacy has resided with?
18

1

A

Was I supposed to?

2

Q

Yes.

3

A

Oh.

4

Q

You did not.

No, I didn't.
Can you please tell the Court where

5

you have lived going back to —

6

deposition of the court, you started with where you had lived

7

in 1994.

8

we were divorced in Kansas and tell the Court where you and

9

the children have resided since

10

Can you go back —

MS. BOLIN:

well, in your —

in your

can you go back to the time when

—

Your Honor, I object to that.

11

been —

12

For her to go back and to list all that, I think, is

13

irrelevant.

14
15
16

they've been divorced

THE COURT:

since

They've

1989, I believe.

The question was about what were the

reasons for the divorce?
MR. KINGDON:

No.

The question was regarding where

17

the plaintiff and the children have resided since the

18

divorce.

19
20

THE COURT:

Since the divorce.

back five years.

Let's see.

Well, let's just go

That will be

—

21

MR. KINGDON:

That's fine.

22

THE COURT:

Yeah, let's —- that would be, what,

23

1997?

24

MR. KINGDON:

25

THE COURT:

1997.

All right.
19

MR. KINGDON:
THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor.

Answer the question

THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:
A

Okay.
-- from 1997.

'97, I was in
THE COURT:

—

—

Well, let me —

let me see if —

ask this to see if I can speed this up.
Mr. Kingdoms

answer, and

let me

The —

I'm

looking

at

basically, you

know —

neither party has really filed the affidavit,

you know, even though I've requested that.
The —

and Mr. Kingdon mentioned —

said it hadn't

been filed.

But this is what Mr. Kingdon says as far as

Stacy goes.

The child lived with her father from June

1994

through

December

1994, from August

1996 to May

1997, from August 1999 through December 1999, and from
July 17th, 2001 to July —

June 4th, 2002.

Do you agree

with that?
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

(Nods head)

Answer out loud.

THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:
you

Yes.

All right.

I think that satisfies what

—
MR. KINGDON:
THE COURT:
MR. KINGDON:

Yes.
—

Yes, Your

—

were trying to get.
Yes, Your Honor.
20

1

THE COURT:

2

MR. KINGDON:

3

Q

Proceed.
Okay.

(By Mr. Kingdon: )

4

issue

of

having

5

Stacy —

6

Court about that?

When the —

the defendant, myself, having

how did all of that come about?

7

A

Say your question again.

8

Q

Can you tell —

9

how did the whole
custody of

Can you tell the

can you please tell the court why

it is that you agreed to a change of custody?

10

A

Oh, okay.

All right.

11

eighth grade.

12

out of your check to send to me for both children, and the

13

plan was that Stacy would stay with you through high school.

14

And so in order to straighten out —

15

for her when she was with me, Utah says that we would have to

16

go through the court system legally and change custody.

17
18

Q

Child —

Stacy was living with you in

Utah was still pulling child support

So you recognized the jurisdiction of Utah?

You

agreed that Utah had proper jurisdiction in the case?

19

A
your

They were the ones that had to take the money out

20

of

21

handling it at that point.

22

so you weren't paying

Q

check

for

child

support.

So, yeah,

they

were

And then you were aware at the time when Stacy came

23

out to —

pardon me.

24

Stacy —

25

this past time?

Can you tell the Court about when

or when Stacy came to visit you after being in Utah
Can you tell

—
21

1

A

Like tell about the visit?

2

Q

Can you tell the Court when that occurred, when

3

Stacy came back to visit you?

4
5
6
7

A

Well, let's see.

Q

Okay.

June 4thf she flew here to visit

me.
And she's resided —

she's resided here in

Darien since that time?

8

A

Correct.

9

Q

Did —

were —

at that time that she resided with

10

you, were you —

were you given notice that custody had been

11

changed in Utah by the Utah court?

12

A

Huh-uh, no.

13

Q

When did you receive notice that custody had been

14

changed?

15

A

July something.

16

Q

Okay.

I don't recall the date.

When you kept Stacyf did you do so knowing

17

that there was —

18

custody in Utah through the Utah court?

19

here in Georgia during her last visit, did you —

20

know that there —

21
22
23

A

that you had already agreed to a change of
When you kept Stacy
did you

a change was imminent in the Utah court?

We were in the process of doing what needed to be

done.
Q

Okay.

Have

you

ever

attempted

to

change

the

24

custody modification that was entered June 11th in the 3rd

25

Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County?

Have you ever
22

1

attempted to change that custody through that forum?

2

MS. BOLIN:

Your Honor, I object.

She obviously

3

has because she's here today and that change of custody

4

was based on a significant change in circumstances.

5

would object to the

6

THE COURT:
filing a petition

8

MR. KINGDON:

9

THE
court

Yes.
—

for

modification

in

the

Utah

—
MR. KINGDON:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. KINGDON:
A

—

COURT:

11

14

—

Well, I think he's asking about like

7

10

I

Yes, Your Honor.
—

is what he asked about.
Yes, Your Honor.

I haven't done that paperwork, but I sent them a

15

letter prior to the date when she was supposed to return to

16

let them know that I needed to do something.

17
18

Q

(By Mr. Kingdon:)

Have you ever —

have you since

that point filed any papers in the courts in Utah?

19

A

My lawyer's taken care of that for me.

20

Q

So

21
22

~

THE COURT:
A

The answer is no at this time.

Oh, I myself, no.

23

THE

24

yourself

25

correct?

COURT:
has

not

Well,
filed

anybody
any

on

papers

your

behalf

in Utah;

is

or
that

23

THE WITNESS: You have or haven't?
MS. BOLIN:

Your Honor, we've filed everything in

the Utah courts.

They have been apprised of these

actions as was proved by the orders —
THE COURT: What Mr. Kingdon wants to know, has any
formal legal paperwork been filed in the Utah courts,
like a petition for modification there, is what he's
asking.
MR. KINGDON:

Yes, Your Honor.

MS. BOLIN:

A petition for modification was not

filed there, but a petition for modification in the
Georgia

courts,

based

on

a

significant

change

of

circumstances, was filed.
THE COURT:

I understand, but the question is, has

any paperwork been filed in Utah.

That's what —

formal

legal paperwork, motion, petition.
MS. BOLIN: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: The answer is —
MS. BOLIN:

No, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

—

no; is that correct?

THE WITNESS: Correct, I think.
THE COURT:

Okay.

That's what -- that's what he

wants to know.
MR. KINGDON:

That was my question, Your Honor.

Thank you.
24

1

THE COURT:

2

Q

All right.

(By Mr. Kingdon: )

Proceed.

Linary, can you tell the Court

3

why you wanted to have the custody modification that was done

4

in Utah —

5

done here through the Georgia court system?

why you wanted to have that custody modification

6

A

Why here instead of Utah?

7

Q

Yes.

8

A

Wellf

9

because this is where —

Stacy considers her home more than Utah.

10

an extended period of time.

11

for me to leave.

12

Utah.

13

Georgia is where
I've been here for

I was working, so it was hard

You weren't working, so you could leave

It just seemed more appropriate to me.

Q

Okay.

Did your desire to have the Georgia court

14

take jurisdiction of this case —

did it have anything to do

15

with the fact that there is a difference between Georgia and

16

Utah law regarding the choice of the child?

17

A

No, because I didn't know about that.

18

Q

Yet did you state in your affidavit —

or excuse

19

me —

in your petition to this Court that for a modification

20

or change that the child —

21

the order based on the fact that the child was age fourteen?

or that the Court should modify

22

A

Say that again.

23

Q

In your petition to this Court here, did you state

24

that you should be given custody of Stacy because she is age

25

fourteen and under —

was that one of the reasons that was
25

1

stated to this Court why you should have custody of Stacy at

2

this time?

3

A

4

I don't recall if I stated that.

That's not the

reason I think I should have custody.

5

MR. KINGDON:

6

THE COURT:

7

MR.

Okay.

Your Honor

—

Any more questions for Mrs. Kingdon?

KINGDON:

I'm

a

little

unsure

if

have

8

moved —

9

moved into a child custody proceeding now at these —

10
11

perhaps you can help me, Your Honor.

we

Have we
at

this point?
THE COURT:

Well, you know, Mr. Kingdon, the way I

12

view this is I've

13

issue, and you are contesting that.

14

letting you put some facts on the record so that you can

15

appeal this matter and that you'll have some basis for

16

appeal.

17

MR. KINGDON:

18

THE COURT:

already

decided

the

jurisdictional

And basically, I'm

Thank you, Your Honor.
Otherwise, the appellate courts just

19

say there's no record and affirm what I do, but I want

20

to be more than fair to you and

21

MR. KINGDON:

22

THE COURT:

—

Thank you, Your Honor.
And I'm basically just trying to get

23

some information on the record for you, and that's why I

24

wanted to get the dates down.

25

MR. KINGDON:

Yes, Your Honor.
26

THE COURT:
there's

any

And I think —

contest

about

parties agree to that.

I really don't think

the dates.

I think

both

And now that we've done that,

then, well f yes, today is —

today is the purpose —

I

mean, the purpose of today is for me to decide temporary
custody, I guess, until a final hearing.
Now, on the other hand, I'll just tell you if I've
got

two

young

ladies

who

are both

over

the

age

of

fourteen or older who are making an election and are
going to tell me that, then unless you show that she is
a unfit parent totally unsuitable for custody, then I'm
going to follow their election.
MR. KINGDON:

Yes, Your Honor, I understand.

THE COURT:

So I really don't need a lot of —

I

mean, you're entitled to ask for it if you want to try
to prove

that

she's

unfit, but

that's what

I would

probably say the law is on this subject right now.
MR. KINGDON:

Your Honor, is there an appropriate

way for me to ask you what the findings of fact —
the findings of fact were regarding
THE COURT:

MR. KINGDON:
with

the

—

Well, I mean, pretty much what the

findings of fact are going to be is

spoke

what

I'm

—

sorry, Your Honor.

Honorable

Judge

When you

Livingston, what

the

findings of fact were.
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THE COURT:

Just —

so far there's nothing been any

surprises of what we conferred about.
of

times were

basically

—

The same length

well, maybe

discrepancies, but nothing important.

a

few minor

We discussed this

and we looked at the Utah paperwork that had been filed
there in Utah, and I faxed him the paperwork that had
been filed here.
And basically, what he said is that one child has
moved

from place

to

place, and

the

other

child

has

stayed with Mrs. Kingdon primarily most of the time and
that —

and has been with Mrs. Kingdon since, what, 1999

here in Georgia for the most part and that —

and she

has had legal custody of Stacy until June or July of
2002, even though she hasn't had physical custody.
And we discussed all of that and basically because
of the two children's situation, he thought that Utah
should defer to Georgia for jurisdictional purposes, and
I'm going to say that in my findings of fact.
MR. KINGDON:
that

there's

that

—

—

THE COURT:

Right.
in both

My problem, Your Honor, is
states, there's

the

statute

I'm aware of that, Mr. Kingdon, and I

believe what the statute says is the judges may allow
the parties to participate, and if they aren't allowed
to participate, they're allowed to file paperwork.
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And the paperwork

that we had

in Utah that you

filed and the paperwork that we had here in Georgia that
Mrs. Kingdon filed was both reviewed by both judges.
And I know you may have wanted to file more paperwork,
but the issue really —

the issue of the length of the

children staying is really not in question.

I mean,

that's what both judges had in front of them.
MR. KINGDON:
I

mean,

it

Right.

was

But at the time, Your Honor,

obviously

jurisdictional matter, the —
longer than six months.
THE COURT:

—

in

referring

to

the

Stacy had been with me for

Her home state

That's correct.

—

We were both aware of

that.
MR. KINGDON:

Her home state was Utah.

THE COURT:

We were both aware that she had been

with you longer than six months and the other child had
been with Mrs. Kingdon since —

in Georgia since around

1999.
MR. KINGDON:

Was

there

any question

about

the

propriety of Utah having entered that modification?
THE COURT:

Well, he had that in front of him and

we related that back to each other.
MR. KINGDON:

Okay.

So in the communication, both

Courts agreed that Utah had proper jurisdiction to make
that custody modification?

Was that —

or was that ever
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even brought up?
THE COURT:
challenged.

Well, it was —

This is just

MR. KINGDON:
THE COURT:

—

That was not challenged?
No, no.

MR. KINGDON:

Okay.

THE COURT:

There's no —

that.

yeah, and that wasn't

we didn't argue about

I mean, we both understood that Utah had entered

an order in June —
MR. KINGDON:
THE COURT:

It was

—

July of 2002.

MR. KINGDON:
THE COURT:

July, is it?

June 11th, 2002.
June 11th of 2002.

MR. KINGDON:

Okay.

So there was no question that

Utah had proper jurisdiction at the time?
THE COURT:

Well, I mean, there's an order.

not getting into whether they did or didn't.

I'm

I mean,

you know, Judge Livingston thought so at the time.
MR. KINGDON:

Right.

THE COURT:

Okay.

So I'm not going to —

I mean, that

wasn't a question either.
MR. KINGDON:
THE COURT:

All right.
Now, do you have any more questions for

Mrs. Kingdon?
MR. KINGDON:

Your Honor, I just —

I apologize.
30

1

I've not had an opportunity to be heard by either Court

2

regarding the jurisdiction, which I —

3
4

THE COURT:
testify.

5

Well, I'm

Do you have any more questions for her?

MR. KINGDON:

6

Q

Let's see.

(By Mr. Kingdon: )
was

getting ready to let you

7

there

communication

8

jurisdiction?

Linary, were you

between

the

Courts

aware that
regarding

9

A

I found out afterwards when my attorney told me.

10

Q

Okay.

11
12
13

Did your or your attorney participate in

those communications?
A

I didn't.

I'm not sure if she did.

MR. KINGDON:

Okay.

Your Honor, again I'll just

14

state this before I ask my next question, but again I

15

feel that these —

16

these proceedings and

17

THE COURT:

18

21
22
23

—

All right.

Mrs. Kingdon, you can step

down.

19
20

that this is not the proper forum for

(WITNESS WITHDREW FROM THE STAND)
THE COURT:
Bolin.

Bring —

MS. BOLIN:

Let's hear from the two children, Ms.
call Stacy or Jennifer (sic) up.
Your Honor, do you want to hear that in

chambers or in open court?

24

THE COURT:

What?

25 J

MS. BOLIN:

Do you want to hear that in chambers or
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open court?
THE COURT:
Julie up.

No.

I'll hear it right here.

I mean, I'm just going to ask —

we're going to ask her.

Bring

that's all

Julie come on up.

(WITNESS APPROACHES THE WITNESS STAND)
THE COURT:

Raise your i: i ght hand.

Be sworn in.

(JULIE KINGDON IS SWORN BY THE CLERK)
THE COURT:

You can have a seat.

(WITNESS COMPLIES)
THE

COURT:

I'll

askyou,

Julie —

Julie; your

birthday is July 11th, 1986?
MS. J. KINGDON:
THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

And where do you wish to reside?

With

your mother or your father?
MS. J. KINGDON:
THE COURT:

My mother.

All right.

Thank you.

You can have a

seat.
(WITNESS WITHDREW FROM THE STAND)
THE COURT:

Stacy, come on up.

(WITNESS APPROACHES THE WITNESS STAND)
THE COURT:

Raise your right hand.

Be sworn in.

(STACY KINGDON IS SWORN BY THE CLERK)
THE COURT:

Have a seat.

(WITNESS COMPLIES)
THE COURT:

Stacy, you were born March 5th, 1988?
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MS. <* , KINGDON:
THE COURT:

(Nods head)

You're fourteen years of age?

MS. S- KINGDON:
THE COURT:

(Nods head)

Now, who do you elect to live with?

Your mother or your father?
MS, S. KINGDON:
THE COURT:

My mother.

Have a seat.

(WITNESS WITHDREW FROM THE STAND)
THE COURT:

All right.

Mr. Kingdon —

do you have

any more witnesses, Ms. Bolin?
MS. BOLIN:

No, Your Honor, but I would present to

the Court a copy of an affidavit of the plaintiff.

The

Court indicated earlier that he did not have one in the
record.
THE COURT:

I haven't seen it in here.

Have you

given Mr. Kingdon a copy?
MS. BOLINi

Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. KINGDON:
know

I'm

sorry, Your

Honor.

I don't

—
THE COURT:

This says it's filed July 10th, so I

assume it's in here, then.
THE CLERK:

It should be.

THE COURT:

Okay.

Well, find it for me.

(CLERK COMPLIES)
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THE COURT:

All right,

Mr. Kingdonf do you want to

testify?
MR- KINGDON:
THE COURT:

Yes f Your Honor.
Come on up.

(DEFENDANT APPROACHES THE WITNESS STAND)
THE COURT:

Raise your right hand and be sworn in.

(BRIAN KINGDON IS SWORN BY THE CLERK)
THE COURT.
like.

Now,

jurisdiction

Have a seat.
what

and

you're

the

children have livedr

length

Say anything you would

doing
of

is
the

talking
time

about

where

the

which we've already agreed on, I

think, but say anything else you'd like to say.
MR. KINGDON:

Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

This is not asking questions.

This is

you testifying, making statements.
Ml<. KINGDON:
THE COURT:

This is me testifying.
Go ahead.

MR. KINGDON:
primarily
that's

address

Yes f Your Honor.
th*1

I will attempt to

jurisdictional

matter

since

—

THE

COURT:

I'm

going to give you a chance

to

argue.
MR. KINGDON:
THE COURT:

Oh.
This is just your testimony

MR. KINGDON:

—

Just my testimony.
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THE COURT:

—

MR. KINGDON:
Linary in 1985.

about facts,
Okay.

Your Honor, I was married to

We had two children, Julie and Stacy.

We were divorced in 1989.

At that time the divorce was

done on basically an emergency basis in Kansas because I
was in the military and T was under orders to go to
Korea.
And so there was no —

I was under orders to go to

Korea to an area where I would not be able to have the
children.

So there was no dispute at the time that

Linary should have the children because I was totally
going to be unable to have the children.
Shortly after the divorcef Linary suffered a mental
and emotional breakdown.

She was hospitalized.

She was

diagnosed with bipolar mental disorderf manic depressive
with

paranoia.

I

was

forced

to

take

a

hardship

discharge from the Army in order to take care of the two
children because she was unable to.
So they lived with me for a time, and then Linary
came and picked them —
out of the —

and I moved to Utah.

out of Kansas.

She moved

Neither one of us, to my

knowledge, has returned to Kansas to live.
I took the children for a time, then she came and
picked

up

the

children.

And

since

that

time,

the

children have at various times lived with me either at
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the plaintiff's request —

either at Linary's request or

by mutual agreement•
Julie has spent a more substantial amount of time
with me.

Most recent —

children,
except

and

for

a

then
brief

well f I moved to Utah with the

I have

resided

six-month

stay

there
in

ever

the

since

state

of

Washington in 1996.
I have —
by

I have been troubled throughout the years

difficulties

in dealing

with the plaintiff.

Her

diagnosed mental disorder has made it difficult to make
agreements and hold to those agreements with her and
deal with the children.
The children have —

like I saidf

have gone back

and forth, and Julie has spent more time with —
more time with me than Stacy.
the mother's

much

I believe that through

influence, in large measure, the reason

that Stacy does not wish to reside with me has a lot to
do with the influence that her mother has had on her.
There are some specific things that I learned when
Stacy was here this last time from July 17th of 2001 to
May of 2002, regarding things that she says that her
mother

has told

her about me and so forth.

I have

brought copies of some of the things that both Julie and
Stacy have written in this regard.
The charges of child abuse are really nothing new.
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Most every time the children have been with me, when
they have returned to their motherf
and said —

she has called me

basically told me that while the children

were with me, that they were neglected, abused, and so
forth.

This is just the first time that this

has—

this has come before the Court, these charges.
I —

in my answer to this court, I have denied most

of the charges that Linary has made.

I do —

I do admit

that there was arguing in my home in Utah, but I do not
believe that the arguments were in the nature of abuse
to Stacy in any way.
A lot of Stacy's and Linary's testimony regarding
this matter are distortions of facts or just outright
lies.

Stacy has stated that she cut her wrists.

If she

were to come up in front of this Court and hold up her
wrists to the Court, the Court would see no evidence of
scarring or anything like that.
She has said that while she was with me that she
contemplated suicide.

I have no knowledge of that.

I

do know that in a journal entry that she made concerning
her mother —

in a journal entry, Stacy stated that she

thought that she was depressed and that her mother was
going to commit suicide.
I believe that it is in Stacy's best interest to
remain

in

Utah.

She

has more

structure

there.

I
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ll

understand that while she's here, she's allowed to do a

2

lot of things that she simply would not be allowed to do

3

if she were with myself and my wife in Utah.

4

And I'm very concerned for both of my daughters.

I

5

want what's best for them.

I am in no way an abusive

6

parent.

7

children.

8

that I have never physically abused them, and I find

9

such allegations offensive and repugnant.

I've been charged with physical abuse of the
Both children could tell this Court or anyone

10

I could address more why I think that Linary is an

11

unfit mother, but it seems that the intention of this

12

Court is to give the children their choice of who they

13

want to live with.

14

and I understand that, based an what little I know of

15

Georgia law, that that pretty much follows the provision

16

of law.

That

who they want to live with,

17

And I do not want to turn this court into a forum

18

for showing, you know, who the better parent is or why I

19

think that —

20

not

21

because I don't believe that the proper forum to hear

22

those issues is here.

23

things.

24

fitted

why that I think that the mother is really
to

THE COURT:

have

Stacy,

again,

in

large

measure,

I think that pretty much covers

Any questions, Ms. Bolin?

25 I CROSS-EXAMINATION OF BRIAN KINGDON
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1

BY MS, BOLIN;

2

Q

Mr. Kingdonf are you employed?

3

A

I am not currently employed.

4

Q

When was the last time you were employed?

b

A

I was laid off at the very end of last year, so

6

December 31st.

7

Q

What kind of educational background do you have?

8

A

I

9

have

.

degree

in

—

a

Bachelor's

MS. BOLIN:

That's all, Your Honor.

11

THE COURT:

You may have a seat.

12

14
15

in

psychology and also a Bachelor's degree in accounting.

10

13

degree

(DEFENDANT WITHDRAWS FROM THE STAND)
THE

COURT:

I'll

give

you

the

opening

and

go ahead and

just

concluding argument, Ms. Bolin.
MS. BOLIN:

Your Honor, I'll

16

quickly reiterate that jurisdiction has been placed with

17

the Georgia courts.

18

significant

19

returned from Utah and came to Georgia.

20

change

Our petition here is based on a
in

circumstances

once

the

child

Based on the allegations set forth in the verified

21

pleadings and based on their testimony

22

would submit that Georgia is, in fact, the proper forum

23

and that these children —

24

under Georgia law to choose where they wish to reside.

25

here today, I

both girls should be entitled

And I think they've made it clear that they wish to
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reside

in

Georgia

with

their

mother,

and

I

would

respectfully submit to the Court that that is where they
need to be.
THE COURT:

Mr. Kingdon?

MR. KINGDON:
that

this

Your Honor, again I do not believe

is the proper

forum

for this hearing.

I

believe that it is in the best interest of Stacy Marie
Kingdon that she remain in Utah in accordance with the
agreement that the mother made that she should remain
there and that I should have custody.
I do not believe that the mother is particularly
fit.

I believe that she is not capable or willing to

understand how her mental disorders affect her children
or what

her

negative

influence

their relationship with me.
this matter should —
revisit —

on them

is regarding

And I believe that t h e —

I believe that this Court should

look at again how this Court came to this

basis.
It troubles me, Your Honor —

it troubles me that

charges of child abuse have been made, but not at any
point —

and because of those charges of child abuse,

because that was raised, this case has been moved from
Utah, which had proper jurisdiction, down to this court.
Yet the plaintiff has not at any point given this
Court any real substantial evidence that there was child
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abuse.

And to me, it seems like a violation of my right

to due process that I have been accused of child abuse
and

never

been

given

opportunity

to

present

facts

regarding that.
The case has been moved based on that.

Yet here in

this court, that really does not seem to matter under
Georgia law.
a —

This is a matter of —

the fact that I'm

I'm a citizen of the United States.

to due process under the law whether

I'm entitled

I'm

in Utah or

Georgia, anywhere.
And

allegations

circumstances

of my

have

been

family

raised

and my

have been greatly

—

the

altered

without having to substantiate any of those claims, and
that truly bothers me that that is how this is being
handled.

And

again, that's why

I believe that this

court is not the proper forum for this.

were

THE COURT:

Ms. Bolin, anything further?

MS. BOLIN:

No, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

All right.

divorced

joint custody
Kingdon

—

parties

was

September

Thank you.

I'll find that the parties

11th,

1989, in Kansas; that

of both children was awarded to Linary

I mean, Linary
awarded

on

—

joint

September

custody
11th,

to

both

1989,

with

physical custody with Linary Kingdon; that Stacy Marie
Kingdon

lived with her father from June

1994 through
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1

December 1994f from August 1996 to May 1997f from August

2

1999 through December 1999, and from July 17th, 2001 to

3

June 4th, 2002; that there was a June 11th, 2002 consent

4

order

5

(sic) to Brian Kingdon; that on —

6

Stacy.

entered

into

Utah

changing

custody

from

Stacy

now, that was with

7

Now, as far as Julie goes, she's lived with the

8

mother basically for the last five years, and the mother

9

has resided in Georgia with a brief stay in

10

MR. KINGDON:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. KINGDON:

13
14
15
16

—

Your Honor?
What?
I'm

sorry.

Julie has not resided

with her mother for the past five years.
THE COURT:

Well, you said she's briefly

stayed

with you some.
MR. KINGDON:

She's stayed —

17

me much more than Stacy.

18

I gave those

Julie has stayed with

You have the dates for Stacy.

—

19

THE COURT:

Yes.

20

MR. KINGDON:

I gave those dates because of t h e —

21

of the matter of me having custody of Stacy according to

22

Utah, but Julie has not lived with her mother for the

23

past five years.

24
25

THE COURT:

I'm sorry.
Well, Ms. Bolin, when has Julie stayed

with the mother?
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MS. BOLIN:

Your Honor, just a second.

(MS. BOLIN CONFERS BRIEFLY WITH THE PLAINTIFF)
MS. BOLIN:
always

Your Honor, the physical custody has

been with

year.

The

the mother

children

lived

until June

11th of this

intermittently

with

both

parents.
And to actually establish how much time was spent
in both homes, I don't have that information
available, but we can have
THE COURT:
three

years

—

Where has Julie

since

readily

Mrs. Kingdon

lived for the last

returned

to Georgia,

1999?
MRS.

KINGDON:

When

Stacy

and

I

returned

to

Georgia, Julie was with her dad, but then four months
later she came to visit, didn't want to go back and has
been with me then —

so that would have been December

three years ago.
THE COURT:

December of 1999?

MRS. KINGDON:
THE COURT:

And she's been with you since?

MRS. KINGDON:
THE COURT:

Correct.

Correct.

All right.

MR. KINGDON:

She has resided —

she resided with

me before December of 1999, and in December of 1999, she
stayed here with her in

—
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THE COURT:
Julie

is

All right.

concerned

that

I'll find that as far as

the

mother

has

always

had

physical custody of her and that's never changed as far
as legal physical custody, and that from December of
1999 until today's date she's resided with the mother in
Georgia.
I'll find that on July —
what did I say?
an

that o n —

June 11th, 2002, the Utah court entered

order, consent

physical

let's see —

custody

order,

of

between

Stacy

the

parties

giving

to Mr. Kingdon; that

on—

that the child came to visit supposedly for one month, I
believe, by agreement of the parties in July.
right?

Was it July or June?

MRS. KINGDON:

June 4th, she

—

MR. KINGDON:

June 4th is when she came.

THE

June

COURT:

expressed

a desire

Kingdon's

objections;

Kingdon

Is that

filed

4 th,

to stay
that

a motion

for

one

month, but

then

and did

stay despite Mr.

on

3rd,

July

for ex-parte

2002, Mrs.

relief

and

also

seeking a petition for modification of the Utah order
and also stated that there was a jurisdictional dispute;
that Judge Livingston, superior court judge of Utah, and
myself conferred by phone.
We reviewed the Utah paperwork that had been filed.
We reviewed the Georgia paperwork that had been filed.
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We discussed this matter.

We exchanged faxes of the

different paperwork that had been filed.
Judge

Livingston

declined

to

exercise

Utah

jurisdiction and agreed that Georgia was the home state
of both children because of significant contacts and the
best

interest

of

the

children

and

emergency

action

needed and that he entered a Utah order; and that on
July 8th, 2002, I entered an order giving Georgia —

no

August 5th, 2002, I entered an order determining that
both children —
both

minor

the forum for determining custody of

children,

Stacy

and

Julie,

was

properly

vested with the state of Georgia and that Georgia was
the home state as far as jurisdictional purposes.
And then based on the election of both children
being

over

custody

the

with

age

the

of

fourteen,

mother,

Linary

I

grant

Kingdon,

temporary
of

both

children at this time.
Ms. Bolin, you draw up and order and, Mr. Kingdon,
you can now review your

legal options based on this

order once it's signed.
Now, Ms. Bolin, I want you to give Mr. Kingdon
either a fax or copy him the order as soon as you get it
prepared and I've signed it.
soon as possible.
MS. BOLIN:

Make sure he gets that as

Do you have his address

—

Yes, Your Honor.
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THE COURT:

—

and/or fax number?

MS. BOLIN:

Yes.

THE COURT:
Kingdon?

Anything

Any questions?

MR. KINGDON:
there

else you want to say, Mr.

some

Yes, Your Honor.

sort

of

record

kept of

Was there —
the

was

communication

between you and Judge Livingston?
THE COURT:

Ms. Kennedy, have you got a card for

Mr. Kingdon?
COURT REPORTER:

You mean today?

MR.

No,

KINGDON:

Livingston had with
THE COURT:

the

conversation

that

Judge

—

No, there wasn't any record.

MR. KINGDON:

There was not any record kept of

that?
THE COURT:

No.

MR. KINGDON:

And then I don't —

I'm sorry.

I

don't know Georgia law, but I would like to enter my
notice to appeal the decision of this Court.
THE COURT:

You're acting as your own attorney, Mr.

Kingdon, so you'll figure out —

you can figure out what

to do.
MR. KINGDON:
THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor.
But Ms. Kennedy will give you her card.

MR. KINGDON:

Thank you.
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THE COURT:

And I'll note for the record that my

court reporter is giving you her card at this time.
(COURT

REPORTER

CONFERS

BRIEFLY

WITH

MR.

KINGDON)
THE COURT:

All right.

Thank y'all very much.

You're free to go.
MR. KINGDON:

Thank you, Your Honor.

(HEARING CONCLUDED, 10:32 a.m.)
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C E R T I F I C A T E

STATE OF GEORGIA,
COUNTY OF WARE:

I hereby certify the foregoing hearing, pages 1 through
47,

represents

a

true

and

complete

transcription

of

the

testimony reported by me on August 19, 2002.
I further certify I have no interest in the outcome of
this case, and I am neither kin nor counsel to any party.
I

further

certify

I

have

not

entered

into

any

contractual agreements with any party involved in this case.
This
upon

the

certification
disassembly

is expressly
or

withdrawn

photocopying

of

the

and

denied

foregoing

transcript of the proceedings or any part thereof, including
exhibits, unless disassembly or photocopying is executed by
the undersigned certified court reporter.
This, the 20th day of November 2002.
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